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INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade, the two-tier tender offer has baffied the 
courts, mystified the legislatures, and haunted the law reviews. 1 This 
puzzling spectre has tormented legal thinkers with a practical di-
lemma. On the one hand, such offers appear to be coercive,2 and, per-
haps worse, the threat of coercion has been cited as a justification (or 
excuse) for the most offensive defensive tactics, such as greenmail and 
poison pills. 3 On the other hand, two-tier offers seem on the average 
to benefit shareholders who in spite of apparent coercion receive sig-
1. See Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 676-93 (1984); Co=ent, The Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender 
Offer, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 811 (1984) [hereinafter Co=ent, The Two-Tiered Tender Offer]; 
Co=ent, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an 
Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 389 (1982) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers]. The issue appears to have been first identified in Brud· 
ney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 330-
40 (1974) [hereinafter Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares], and analyzed further in Brudney & 
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978) [hereinafter Brud-
ney & Chirelstein, A Restatement]. 
2. See R. FERRARA, M. BROWN & J, HALL, TAKEOVERS: ATIACK AND SURVIVAL: A 
STRATEGisr's MANUAL 123-29 (1987) [hereinafter FERRARA]; Andre, Tender Offers/or Corpo-
rate Control: A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865 (1987); 
Co=ent, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers, supra note 1, at 812; Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair 
Shares, supra note 1, at 336-37; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 1, at 1361-62; 
Camey, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case 
Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. REs. J. 341; Bradley, Intelfirm Tender Offers 
and the Market/or Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 355-56 (1980). Lipton, Corporate Go1•em-
ance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1987); see also Bebchuk, 
The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911 (1987) 
[hereinafter Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender]; Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal 
Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Toward 
Undistorted Choice] (arguing that all tender offers are somewhat coercive); Willis, Your Money: 
Takeovers Pose a Tough Choice, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1988, at 18, col. 1 (natl. ed.). But see 
Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 13 VA. L. REV. 111, 151-52 (1987) (sug-
gesting that coercion is not a complete explanation since some bids are rejected even when there 
is no resistance by management); Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate 
Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 
105 (1987) (arguing that it is artificial to characterize the attraction of selling one's shares at a 
premium as coercion). 
3. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. y. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. in 
part, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Dawson, Pence & Stone, 
Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 Bus. LAW. 423 (1987); Macey & Mcchesney, A Theoretical 
Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985); Note, Protecting Shareholders Against 
Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964 (1984); 
Co=ent, Shareholder Rights Plans - Do They Render Shareholders Defenseless Against Their 
Own Management?, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 991 (1987); Note, The Hobbs Act and RICO: A Remedy 
for Greenmail?, 66 TExAs L. REV. 647 (1988); Grundfest, Two-Tier Bids Are Now a Defensive 
Technique, NATL. L.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 26, col. 1; Greenmail Blues, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 
28, col. 1 (editorial); cf. Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
329 (1988). 
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nifi.cant premiums in connection with such offers. 4 Thus, though the 
worry persists, partial and two-tier offers remain wholly unregulated 
under the Williams Act, the general federal tender offer law, which, 
ironically, was meant to insure that every tender offer is a fair fight. 5 
The continued availability of coercive offers has been an important 
reason for widespread state takeover legislation. 6 Despite the fact that 
in 1982 the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 7 held that an 
Illinois statute, which, among other things, required advance notice of 
tender offers and provided for a fairness review by a state official, was 
unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce, many 
states have ~dopted second-generation takeover statutes. 8 The new 
4. SEC, Office of the Chief Economist, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Of-
fers, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,755, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 83,637 (June 21, 
1984); SEC, Office of the Chief Economist, The Economics of Any-or-All, Partial and Two-Tier 
Tender Offers, (Apr. 19, 1985). 
5. Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982) (adding §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f) to Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934)). See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (holding Illinois takeover 
statute unconstitutional under dormant commerce clause; three Justices also of opinion that stat-
ute was preempted by the Williams Act in which Congress established a scheme that avoided 
favoring either bidders or target management). This is not necessarily to say that the Williams 
Act is flawed. Arguably the Act is purely procedural and designed to establish efficient bidding 
conventions and to reduce information costs and therefore should not be viewed as a cure-all for 
the problems of fairness or fiduciary duty that may arise in the course of a bid. See Langevoort, 
supra note 2, at 110-12; Comment, The Two-Tiered Tender Offer, supra note l, at 818-20; Com-
ment, Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.: Misrepresentation as a Necessary Element of a 
Section J4(e) Cause of Action, 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 645 (1987); Note, SEC Takeover Regulation 
Under the Williams Act, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 580 (1987); see also Schreiber v. Burlington North-
ern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). But see Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 979 (1988) (suggesting that concept of manipulation may be broad enough 
to include misrepresentations affecting market price and holding that investor may justifiably rely 
on integrity of market mechanisms to assure fair pricing in connection with purchases and sales 
of securities). On the other hand, as I suggest in an article in preparation, the Williams Act may 
in fact cause many of the bargaining problems that arise in tender offers. R. Booth, The Problem 
with Federal Tender Offer Law. I agree, however, that the Williams Act performs a valuable 
informational function. See Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 10 VA. L. REv. 717 (1984); Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of 
Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 153 (1986). Even in this context, however, I would argue that 
the value of the Williams Act is overestimated. See also Borden & Weiner, An Investment Deci-
sion Analysis of Cash Tender Offer Disclosure, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 553 (1978); Brudney & 
Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 1, at 330-40. 
6. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651 (1987); Langevoort, 
supra note 2, at 105. 
7. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
8. As of year-end 1986, there were 22 states with some form of second-generation statute. 
See CTS Decision Likely to Spur States to Enact Antitakeover Laws, IRRC Says, 19 Sec. Reg. & 
L. Rep. (BNA), No. 24, at 868 (June 12, 1987); Romano, supra note 2, at 114-20; Garrity, 
Addendum: Post-MITE State Takeover Statutes: Constitutional Issues and Recent Cases, 42 Bus. 
LAW. 586 (1987). In the meantime, and largely as a result of the Supreme Court's April 21, 
1987 decision in CTS upholding the Indiana Act, six more states have adopted new statutes, and 
three have revised existing statutes. See North Carolina Legislature Responds to Attempted Take-
over of Burlington, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 829 (June 5, 1987); 19 Sec. Reg. & 
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 871 (June 12, 1987) (correction regarding North Carolina statute); 
Massachusetts Adopts Broad Anti-Takeover Law, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1099 
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statutes have taken several forms, though all have sought to regulate 
hostile acquisitions by focusing on aspects of corporate governance 
that have traditionally been matters of state law.9 
State takeover laws have been roundly criticized as economically 
inefficient protectionist legislation.10 The conventional wisdom is that 
(July 24, 1987); Arizona Antitakeover Bill Signed During Special Session, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 31, at 1138 (July 31, 1987); "Indiana·Style" Takeover Law Now in Effect in Oregon, 
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1339 (Aug. 28, 1987); Bill Modeled on Indiana Law 
Signed into Law by Missouri Governor, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1269 (Aug. 14, 
1987) (revision of earlier law); Wisconsin Governor Signs Tho Antitakeover Measures, 19 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1463 (Sept. 25, 1987) (revision of earlier law); Delaware Gover-
nor Signs Law Restricting Hostile Takeovers, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 188 (Feb. 5, 
1988); Idaho Governor Signs Anti-Takeover Law Modeled After Indiana, New York, 20 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 501 (Apr. 1, 1988); Pennsylvania Enacts Law Against Hostile Take-
overs, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 502 (Apr. 1, 1988) (statute expressly pennitting 
poison pills); see also NASAA Adopts Model Control Share Act, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), 
No. 18, at 669, 708 (May 6, 1988). With the exception of the Wisconsin and Delaware acts, each 
new act and revision is modeled on the Indiana statute. By comparison, 37 states adopted first. 
generation takeover statutes prior to the decision in MITE. See Garrity, supra, at 586; Romano, 
supra note 2, at 113. See generally SEN. CoMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 
TENDER OFFER DISCLOSURE AND FAIRNESS Acr OF 1987, s. Rep. No. 265, lOOth Cong., 1st 
Sess. 48-56 (1987) [hereinafter SENATE TENDER OFFER REPORT]; The Battle over Tender Offer 
Reform: From the States and the Courts to Congress, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), No. 2, at 60, 
66-67 (Jan. 15, 1988). 
The decision to adopt a new takeover statute in Delaware was particularly controversial. See 
Bandow, Curbing Raiders Is Bad for Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, § 3 (Business) at 2, col. 
3; Veasey, A Statute Was Needed to Stop the Abuses, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, § 3 (Business) at 
2, col. 3; Debate Over a New Takeover Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at 21, col. 3 (natl. ed.); 
Delaware Moves Closer to Adopting Law to Deter Hostile Takeovers, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, at 
41, col. 3; Will Delaware Fall?, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1987, at 30, col. 1 (editorial); Black, Why 
Delaware ls Wary of Anti-Takeover Law, Wall St. J., July 10, 1987, at 18, col. 3; Delaware Falls to 
Adopt Law on Takeovers, Wall St. J., June 16, 1987, at 2, col. 2. For a description of the Dela· 
ware law, see Finkelstein, The New Delaware Takeover Statute, 21 REV. SEC. & CoMM. REG. 47 
(1988). 
9. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651 (1987); Block, Barton & 
Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The ''Second Generation': 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 332, 340 (1986); 
Langevoort, supra note 2. 
10. See Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 9; Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The 
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85' MICH. L. REv. 1 (1986); Danilow & Bentley, State Takeover 
Statutes After MITE, 20 REv. SEC. & CoMM. REG. 13 (1987); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer 
Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62 CoRNELL L. REV. 213 (1977); Pinto, 
Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 473 (1987); Pozen, The New Round of State Tender Offer Statutes, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
89 (1987); Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, 
or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CoRP. L. REv. 3 (1984); Romano, supra note 2; Sargent, Do the 
Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REV. 3 
(1985); Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. 
LAW. 671 (1985); Note, The Tender Offer Regulation Battle Continues: Should States Regulate 
Only Local Companies?, 60 IND. L.J. 721 (1985); Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legis· 
lation: Maryland Takes a New Tack, 83 MICH. L. REv. 433 (1984); Note, The Constitutionality 
of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 203 (1987); Note, Securities Law and the 
Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (1979); How Indiana 
Shielded a Firm and Changed the Takeover Business, Wall St. J., July 1, 1987, at 1, col. 6; Hanks, 
State Takeover Laws: The Second Generation, NATL. L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, at 34, col. I; see also 
Langevoort, supra note 2; Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 563 (1983). 
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takeovers promote efficiency by threatening slack managers with re-
moval. In the argot of legal economists, takeovers are said to reduce 
agency costs.11 The disciplined manager is thus induced to make the 
enterprise as profitable as possible, assuring that corporate resources 
are put to their highest and best use. Consistent with this view, sec-
ond-generation statutes were almost invariably struck down as uncon-
stitutional. But to the presumable surprise of most courts and 
commentators who had spoken on the subject, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America upheld Indiana's 
second-generation statute.12 It had been widely expected that the 
Court would overturn the Indiana act on the theory that a state statute 
which seeks to regulate the takeover process constitutes an impermis-
sible burden on interstate commerce.13 It had become an article of 
faith, it seems, that the market for corporate control was wholly 
within the federal domain and that no thinly (or thickly) veiled effort 
by the states to help entrench local management could be tolerated.14 
With the decision in CTS, it became clear that there is constitu-
tional room for state law in the takeover field. And while state take-
over statutes continue to be heavily criticized (together with the 
decision of the Supreme Court upholding the Indiana act), more and 
more states, including Delaware, rush to enact them.15 In the final 
11. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a 
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1169-74 (1981); Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984). 
12. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). For a recent survey of the cases holding such statutes unconstitu-
tional, see Garrity, supra note 8, at 594-601. 
13. See Cox, The Constitutional ''Dynamics" of the Internal Affairs Rule - A Comment on 
CTS Corporation, 13 J. CoRP. L. 317 (1988); Langevoort, supra note 2; Regan, Siamese Essays: 
(I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) 
Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865 (1987). Despite the fact that the opin-
ion of the MITE Court turned on the dormant co=erce clause, it seems curious in retrospect 
that so many courts and co=entators continued to focus on that argument, since the only real 
analysis was in the plurality opinion that the Illinois act in question was preempted because it 
conflicted with the Williams Act. 457 U.S. at 634-40. This seems all the more curious in that so 
many states crafted their second-generation statutes expressly to avoid preemption. This distinc-
tion was not, however, lost on Judge Posner who authored the reversed decision in CTS. Dy-
namics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. in part, 107 S. Ct. 
1637 (1987). 
14. 794 F.2d at 261, 263-64 (Posner, J.), revd. in part, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). 
15. See Woodward, How Much Indiana's Anti-Takeover Law Cost Shareholders, Wall St. J., 
May 5, 1988, at 24, col. 3 (reporting study finding aggregate loss of $2.65 billion or 6% of total 
value of Indiana companies); Bandow, Curbing Raiders Is Bad for Business, supra note 8; Will 
Delaware Fall?, supra note 8; Expropriation at Home, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1987, at 24, col. 1 
(editorial); Simmons, Shareholders Don't Need "Protection'~ Wall St. J., July 31, 1987, at 14, col. 
3; Romano, State Takeover Laws: Constitutional But Dumb, Wall St. J., May 14, 1987, at 28, col. 
4; Life Tenure for Managers?, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1987, at 32, col. 1 (editorial). But see Veasey, 
A Statute Was Needed to Stop the Abuses, supra note 8; Orr, Shareholders Need a Knight Errant, 
Wall St. J., May 27, 1987, at 30, col. 3; see also Labaton, Business and the Law: States vs. U.S. on 
1640 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1635 
analysis, however, the Indiana'. Control Share Acquisition Chapter16 
and other state takeover laws which, like the Indiana Act, seek to reg-
u1ate the purchase of control shares - though they may have been 
prompted by protectionist motivations - are a remarkably intelligent 
approach to the problem of coercive tender offers. 
The purpose of this article is, first, to describe the problems associ-
ated with two-tier tender offers and the closely related, and perhaps 
still more coercive, partial tender offer. Second, the article will ad-
dress the natural question why such offers have not already been 
banned, suggesting a better view of what coercion means in the con-
text of a tender offer. Third, the article will offer a management-ori-
ented view of coercion, explaining the legitimate interests of managers 
(and other groups) in resisting takeovers, as well as how greenmail and 
poison pills, though subject to abuse, can be used quite properly to 
combat coercion. Fourth, the article will describe the variety of sec-
ond-generation takeover statutes and consider how they attack the 
problem of coercion (in most cases with unacceptable costs). Fifth, 
the article will demonstrate how control share statutes such as the In-
diana Act largely solve these problems quite efficiently and will offer a 
refinement of the Indiana Act which will eliminate the unnecessary 
bias it has for target management in its current form. And finally, the 
article will consider the prospects for survival of state regulation of the 
market for corporate control in light of mounting pressure for new 
federal legislation to preempt the field. 
I. THE APPARENT PROBLEM OF COERCION 
The problem of coercion can best be understood by first examining 
the two-tier tender offer, a simple device that has been around virtu-
ally since tender offers became a common and acceptable way to vie 
for control of target companies.17 The idea is straightforward: By of-
fering more for the first, say, 51 % of the shares of a target and less for 
the remaining ·shares if control is established, a bidder can induce 
more shares to be tendered early for a lower price than would be ten-
dered if there were no risk in holding out. For example, suppose a 
Takeovers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1987, at 30, col. 1 (natl. ed.). But cf. SEC, Office of the Chief 
Economist, Shareholder Wealth Effects of Ohio Legislation Affecting Takeovers (May 18, 1987) 
(passage of Ohio law resulted in price decrease for covered companies of 1.68% to 3.24% not 
including Goodyear and 1.84% to 3.42% including Goodyear). 
16. IND. CQDE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1987). The chapter is referred to 
h~reinafter as the Indiana Act or simply the Act. 
17. See note 1 supra; see also SEC, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, 
supra note 4; SEC, The Economics of Any-or-All, Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra 
note 4. 
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bidder offers $120 per share for the first 51 % of a company which is 
currently trading for $100 and announces that if the 51 % are tendered 
the remaining 49% will be cashed out for $100 per share. (The re-
maining shares can be forcibly purchased by the bidder causing a 
merger between the target company and another company controlled 
by the bidder in which the latter is the survivor with the target's share-
holders paid in cash for their shares.18) A shareholder of the target 
would obviously be strongly tempted to tender in the first tier even if 
he or she thought the $120 offered was too low (unless he or she had 
some reliable way of knowing that other shareholders would hold 
out19). The reason, of course, is that failure to tender in the first tier 
could result in being stuck with a mere $100 in the second-tier cash 
out. 
In this way, a two-tier offer puts considerable pressure on target 
shareholders. Worse still is a partial offer. In the preceding example, 
the offeror announced in advance its plans to cash out the remaining 
minority at the pre-offer market price. (A merger at any lower price 
would be unlikely to pass muster under state law.20) But suppose the 
offeror says nothing about what it intends to do if control is achieved. 
The target shareholder who holds out faces the prospect of owning 
shares in a captive company. The chances are good that if the offer 
succeeds the remaining shares will trade at depressed prices, since fu-
ture tender offers and their disciplinary effect on management21 are 
precluded, and since the new parent company may within fairly broad 
limits operate the target for its own benefit. If, for example, the target 
is rich in cash, the new parent could induce it to lend money to the 
parent on favorable terms. The possibilities are endless. Outright 
looting of the target's assets is, of course, illegal,22 but the target, 
which is now a captive company, will probably not command top dol-
lar in any deal it makes with the parent.23 Even if the parent scrupu-
lously avoids taking undue advantage, the stock market will recognize 
18. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 1, at 1359-65. 
19. See Camey, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra, note 2; see also Dynamics Corp. of 
Am. v. crs Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. in part, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Leebron, 
supra note 5, at 186-91; SEC, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra note 
4; SEC, The Economics of Any-or-All, Partial and Two-Tier Tender Olfers, supra note 4; see also 
Bebchuk, supra note 2 (arguing that all tender offers are coercive to some extent since holdouts 
will be left with shares that may trade at a lower price in the market after the offer). 
20. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
21. See note 11 supra. 
22. See Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36 CASE W. 
R.Es. L. REV. 248, 263-68 (1985). 
23. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Bebchuk, The Pressure to 
Tender, supra note 2. 
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that advantage taking - or what might be called quasi-looting - is 
always possible, and stock of the target will inevitably trade at a lower 
price than it would if independent. After all, given the choice of two 
otherwise identical companies, why would an investor take the extra 
risk associated with the captive company? 
At the extreme, shareholders in the aggregate may conceivably 
lose money from a partial bid. Suppose, as in the previous example, 
the bidder offered $120 per share for the first 50% plus one of the 
shares, and after the bidder had gained control the remaining shares 
fell from the pre-offer $100 to $70. Half of the shareholders would 
have gained $20 per share while half would have lost $30 per share. 
Overall, target shareholders would have lost. Worse yet, the company 
would have been sold to apparently inferior managers. And perhaps 
worst of all, the economy as a whole would lose, since investors, mind-
ful of the risk that they might be forced at some time in the future to 
tender at an inadequate price, will insist on higher returns to compen-
sate for the returns lost from tender offers, raising the cost of capital 
for all companies. 
The central point is that a partial bid may be even more coercive 
than the more blatant two-tier bid. In a two-tier bid, the holdout only 
risks missing out on the offered premium. In a partial bid, the holdout 
risks suffering a loss. Both kinds of bids, however, are coercive, and 
that means that in the end shareholders receive something less for the 
shares they tender in such bids than they would in a free and fair 
negotiation. 
It is arguable that competition will neutralize whatever coercion 
might arise from the form of a bid. After all, if the bidder had discov-
ered a way to keep more gain for itself than was necessary to make the 
deal profitable, another bidder would likely step in and offer more for 
the target, whether in the form of a higher bid per share or a less 
coercive offer, until the prospective returns from the takeover were 
reduced to a normal level. Indeed, statistics indicate that, on average, 
target shareholders enjoy most of the extraordinary gains that arise as 
a result of takeovers while bidders capture little gain in excess of an 
ordinary retum.24 But there may not always be other bidders present 
or ready to provide competition. The market for corporate control is, 
after all, a rarified environment with far fewer actors than the ordinary 
stock market. Moreover, although in the stock market mere observa-
tion of the behavior of other traders may provide enough information 
24. See Leebron, supra note 5, at 174-79. 
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to justify an investment25 since, under most conditions, stocks are effi-
ciently priced and sufficiently liquid to guaranty against significant 
loss, a bidder's decision to seek control of a whole company is vitally 
dependent on what that bidder intends to do with it. 26 
II. WHY COERCIVE OFFERS REMAIN LEGAL 
The straightforward solution to the coercion problem would seem 
to be to prohibit partial and two-tier offers. Yet the courts have con-
sistently refused to interpret the Williams Act to do so, while continu-
ally asserting that the essential policy behind the Act is to insure that 
every tender offer is a fair fight.27 Even the SEC's Tender Offer Advi-
sory Committee, which was assembled in part to study the problem of 
coercive offers, declined to recommend an outright ban on partial or 
two-tier offers.28 Given the attention that has been paid to the coer-
cion problem, it may seem curious that so little has been done as a 
matter of federal law to remedy the situation. Yet despite the 
problems created by partial and two-tier offers, there may indeed be 
serious problems with a rule prohibiting them. 
A. Shareholders Seem To Benefit from Coercive Offers 
Two related reasons are most frequently given for allowing coer-
cive offers (or, more precisely, for not prohibiting them). It has been 
argued that a ban on partial and two-tier offers would eliminate many 
offers which are apparently beneficial to target shareholders. Recent 
studies by the SEC seem to confirm that target shareholders do in fact 
benefit from all kinds of tender offers. As might be expected, the 
greatest benefit comes from "any or all" offers in which shareholders 
receive an average premium of 59.6%, while average blended premi-
ums are 54.5% in two-tier offers and 20.1% in partial tender offers.29 
Similarly, it has been argued that sometimes the bidder cannot afford 
25. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10 VA. L. REv. 549, 
572-79 (1984) (discussing derivatively informed trading); Carney, Signalling and Causation in 
Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863 (1987). 
26. See Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 
60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630 (1985). 
27. See note 5 supra; Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied. 477 U.S. 
903 (1986); see also Comment, The Two-Tiered Tender Offer, supra note 1. 
28. SEE! Advisory Comm. on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations (July 8, 1983) 
(recommendations 14, 16). See also Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer 
Purchase Programs - Advance Notice of Possible Action, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, 
[1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 83,637, at 86,917-18 (June 21, 1984) (expres-
sing reservations of Committee about any further regulation of partial or two-tier offers). 
29. SEC, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra note 4 (noting also 
that SEC rules regarding proration may have encouraged two-tier offers). See also Mirvis, Two-
Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and ''Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues. 38 Bus. LAW. 485 (1983) 
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the higher premiums required to make a noncoercive bid or that the 
perceived gain from acquiring a target may be too small to justify the 
higher premium. 30 In other words, a rule against coercive bids may 
preclude some bidders from bidding and shareholders will be the 
worse off. Neither of these problems is as significant as it might seem. 
Shareholders are not necessarily better off as a result of the gains 
they receive from partial and two-tier bids. The idea that they are 
better off stems from the notion that any premium is better than 
none.31 But that is not so. A simple example illustrates the point. 
Imagine a shareholder with a portfolio consisting of 100 shares of each 
of 300 different companies.32 During the course of a year, bids are 
made under current rules for twenty of those companies at premiums 
(arguing that two-tier offers are designed to speed up tendering of shares and may have been 
encouraged by withdrawal rights that formerly extended beyond final proration date). 
30. Although convincing a bank to finance a takeover can be difficult, the burgeoning junk 
bond market bas provided a ready substitute source of financing and has enabled takeover bids 
that prior to 1983 could not have been mounted. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 2-4 & n.5; see 
Grundfest, supra note 3; SEC Office of the Chief Economist, Noninvestment Grade Debt as a 
Source of Tender Offer Financing (June 20, 1986) Gunk bond financing for all tender offers rose 
from 0.3% in 1981-1984 to 13.6% during first half of 1985 and was predominant source of 
financing for hostile offers). In a further embellishment, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have 
ruled that the Williams Act does not require a bidder to have firm financing before making a 
tender offer. IU Intl. Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1988); Newmont 
Mining Corp. v. Pickens, 831 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). See Williams A.ct Does Not Require 
Firm Financing to Mount Tender Offer, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1721 (Nov. 13, 
1987). On the other band, the most likely security for borrowing to finance a takeover is the 
value of the target's assets and prohibiting coercive bids might unduly encourage bust-up take-
overs. See Lipton, supra note 2; Lipton, Takeover A.buses Mortgage the Future, Wall St. J., Apr. 
5, 1985, at 16, col. 4. As Professor Coffee notes, the courts have suggested they may be more 
lenient toward defensive tactics designed to avert such takeovers. Coffee, supra note 10, at 4 & 
n.4 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173. 180-81 n.12 (Del. 
1986); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 n.4, 1356-57 (Del. 1985)). 
31. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1165-68, 1177-80. The idea that shareholders 
will happily sell their shares for any premium over the market price bas often been expressed in 
judicial decisions. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., C.A. No. 5642 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1985) 
(1985 Westlaw 11,546) (on remand to determine damages from freezeout merger in violation of 
fiduciary duty); Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987) 
(market price before bid is best indication offair value) (proceeding related to 1981 U.S. Steel bid 
for Marathon). 
32. Three hundred is not an arbitrary figure. It appears that in practice it requires a portfolio 
of 200 to 300 shares to duplicate the performance of the S & P 500, which itself is widely re-
garded as the best indication of the market as a whole. See Linked Deals in Stocks and Futures 
Contracts Roil Prices, Critics Say, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (describing mechanics of 
program trading). Although it might be objected that not all shareholders bold portfolios of such 
size and diversity, a convincing argument can be made that they should - since such portfolios 
are readily available at nominal cost through mutual funds- and that tender offer rules ought to 
be constructed with such shareholders in mind. The argument, simply put, is that rational inves-
tors diversify because by doing so they can avoid some of the risk that attends investments in 
individual stocks without sacrificing any of the return. See J. LoRIE, P. DODD & M. KIMPTON, 
THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 23-24 (2d ed. 1985); Langbein & Posner, Mar-
ket Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 1. But see Bines, Modern 
Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 721 (1976); Pozen, Money Managers and Securities Research, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 923 
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of $20 over the market price, and all succeed. The shareholder re-
ceives a total premium of $40,000. Now suppose that under a rule 
banning coercive offers successful bids are made for only ten of the 
companies but at premiums of $50 per share over the market price. 
The shareholder receives total premiums of $50,000 and is clearly bet-
ter off.33 
Needless to say, the numbers are arbitrary. Different numbers 
might result in shareholders being better off under the current regime. 
The point is, however, that target shareholders are not necessarily 
worse off because some bids fail or are not made. The recent SEC 
studies actually support this idea if viewed from the right angle: the 
premium that target shareholders receive depends on the form of the 
bid. In short, shareholders do lose something from partial and two-
tier bids even though they gain from all offers. 
Moreover, there is no convincing reason why a bidder should not 
be able to finance the purchase of a target company at a price less than 
it would be worth under new management. If the perceived gain is at 
all demonstrable, the bidder can borrow to finance the takeover con-
ventionally, by issuing junk bonds, or by simply making the offer con-
tingent on arranging financing at a later date. 34 If the perceived gain is 
too small to justify a noncoercive offer, the offer probably should not 
be made anyway. That is, if the bidder cannot afford to pay what the 
shareholders would demand in a free and open negotiation, the offer, if 
made, should not succeed, since in the end shareholders must be pre-
sumed to be best able to judge what their stock is worth to them. Ad-
mittedly, in some circumstances a coercive offer may be the only way 
for a bidder to do a profitable takeover. Nevertheless, if the target 
company is acquired at a bargain price (from the point of view of the 
target shareholders), the gain to the bidder must come from a loss 
visited on the target shareholders. Indeed, the possibility that some 
bids generate ordinary returns for bidders but none for target share-
holders in the aggregate is entirely consistent with the data. 35 More-
(1976) (both arguing that a much lower level of diversification may be defended depending on an 
investor's objectives). 
There are other reasons for owning stock besides purely passive investment - for example, in 
order to control and manage the company or perhaps in order to cement a customer or supplier 
relationship. It is not necessarily irrational for such investors to fail to diversify. See Baysinger 
& Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of 
the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REv. 1257, 1282-88 (1985); see also text at note 26 supra. 
33. See Booth, Is There Any Valid Reason Why Target Managers Oppose Tender Offers?, 14 
SEC. REG. L.J. 43 (1986). 
34. See note 30 supra. 
35. See SEC, The Economics of Any-or-All, Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra note 
4, tabs. 4a, 5 (seven offers in period 1981-1984 generated less than 0% premium [it's true!]; of all 
partial offers, 52% generated a premium of 20% or less, compared with an average 53.4% pre-
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over, no competition would be expected to arise unless another bidder 
could conceive a more coercive offer which would leave the sharehold-
ers with an even greater loss. In other words, because of the availabil-
ity of coercive bidding techniques, at least some companies are sold for 
less than they would be under a rule prohibiting such bids. As a result 
of those cases, equity capital is a bit more expensive than it should be. 
In short, the capital market is rendered less efficient than it might be. 
It is conceivable, too, that the general availability of coercive bids 
may actually increase the incidence of takeovers. If investors fear a 
loss because of a potential for coercive bids and therefore insist on 
higher returns, the immediate result is lower market prices for stock. 
(As a stock's price falls, its return, held constant in dollar terms, natu-
rally rises as a percentage of the stock's price, and it is the percentage 
return, of course, that concerns investors.) If for some reason bidders 
are more sensitive to decreases in stock prices than shareholders are 
concerned about the danger of coercive bids, coercive bids may keep 
stock prices somewhat depressed and takeover activity unduly 
encouraged. 
Still, the idea that some bids which constitute a gain may be sacri-
ficed in order to assure that remaining bids are made at a fair price 
smacks of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. There 
remains a nagging doubt about prohibiting partial bids. After all, 
there may well be bidders who for one reason or another can be 
trusted not to take advantage of the minority. The real question is, 
how many bids would be eliminated and how many would be sweet-
ened by the proposed rule against coercive tender offers? And perhaps 
more important, which are which? Before addressing this question, 
however, there are other problems with prohibiting coercive bids that 
should be identified. As will be seen, they, too, ultimately point to a 
need to know when a bid that is coercive in form is likely to generate 
losses (or insufficient gains) for target shareholders. 
B. All Offers Are Arguably Coercive and Shareholders Thus Have a 
More Pressing Need for a Negotiating Agent 
A rule against bids which are overtly coercive would miss an ar-
guably more important and pervasive form of coercion, namely, the 
coercion which arises because individual target shareholders perceive 
that it is futile to hold out no matter what the form of the offer.36 
mium for all offers); see also Leebron, supra note 5, at 194-97 (offering possible explanations for 
why bidding may not arise). 
36. See Booth, supra note 33; Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender, supra note 2; Oesterle, Tar-
get Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the 
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Since shareholders are widely dispersed and lack economical methods 
of communicating with each other and coordinating their decisions to 
tender or hold out, each shareholder is more likely to tender, other 
things being equal, since by holding out a shareholder risks the possi-
bility of missing the premium and being stuck with post-bid shares 
which are worth less than the offered cash or securities. Thus, even in 
the case of an offer for any or all of the target company's shares, inves-
tors may lose if target management remains passive and fails to negoti-
ate or resist when there is good reason to believe either that the target 
is worth more than is being offered or simply that the bidder would 
pay more. After all, the bidder is motivated by the prospect of gain 
and will attempt to maximize that gain. While the any-or-all offer 
does not threaten the target shareholder into tendering for too low a 
price, neither does it insure that individual shareholders will know 
whether the price being offered is too low or that they will be able to 
do anything about negotiating for a higher price. Thus even in the 
case of the any-and-all offer, shareholders may prefer fewer offers with 
large premiums to many offers with small premiums. 37 
On the other hand, the stock market might perform this negotiat-
ing function quite nicely even without managerial assistance. To be 
sure, evidence indicates that bidders capture little of the extraordinary 
returns that accompany takeovers. 38 The most likely explanation of 
this phenomenon is that arbitrageurs and other market professionals 
- who frequently amass a majority of target stock during the pen-
dency of an offer - are indeed in a position to negotiate effectively. 39 
But even if market professionals are effective substitute negotiators 
who induce bidders to pay top dollar for their targets, they can be 
expected typically to keep the additional gains for which they negoti-
ate. Ordinary investors would still likely favor some level of manage-
Passivity 17tesis, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 53 (1985). The shareholders' basic need for a negotiating 
agent provides a solid policy rationale not only for Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 
1985), which arguably stands for the proposition that the board of directors of a target company 
has a duty to bargain for the shareholders, but a policy rationale for Securities Exchange Act 
Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1987) as well, which requires a target company to respond to 
a tender offer. See Oesterle, 17te Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware 
Supreme Court, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 117 (1986) [hereinafter Oesterle, 17te Negotiation Model]; 
see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1177-80. The duty of target management to act 
as a negotiating agent, and in particular not to halt the bidding process before the best price has 
been achieved has been affirmed in recent cases. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 
(6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
37. See text at note 33 supra. 
38. See Leebron, supra note 5, at 174-79. 
39. See Romano, supra note 2, at 130-31, 145-48; Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate 
Law, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 395, 409-10 (1983). 
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ment negotiating or resistance, because the ordinary investor can keep 
more of the gain by holding out rather than selling out to the arbi-
trageurs. In short, although arbitrageurs perform a valuable function, 
they may be replaceable by a cheaper bargaining mechanism. 
The idea that shareholders depend on management to negotiate the 
highest possible premium suggests that shareholders also depend on 
management to defend against coercive offers by inducing bidders to 
employ a type of bid that offers a greater return for shareholders. 
Such tactics are, however, often strenuously opposed by shareholders, 
who argue that they are really designed to entrench management.40 
The market bears out this reaction to some extent: There tends to be a 
negative effect (albeit mild) on the stock price of a company which 
adopts defenses, the magnitude of which depends on the precise de-
fense adopted.41 
The most obvious explanation for shareholder opposition to defen-
sive maneuvers is that shareholders really do prefer more tender offers, 
at any premium, to fewer. Shareholder reaction to defensive tactics 
may be seen as proof that shareholders perceive a net benefit from 
tender offers of all kinds. The problem with this explanation is that it 
fails to account for the fact that the form of a tender offer appears to 
have a significant effect on the premium offered and paid. This dis-
crepancy indicates that at the very least shareholders should care 
about the form of a bid and should welcome any good faith effort on 
the part of management to negotiate on their behalf. The fact that 
they do not calls for explanation. 
Discrepant premiums indicate that there is something amiss in the 
market. In theory, there is no reason to expect premiums to vary ac-
cording to the form of a bid.42 No matter what the form, the share-
40. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11; Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent 
Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982); see 
also Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Cose Against Defensive Tactics in Tender 
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1981); see also Holder Resolutions Against Poison Pills Win More 
Support at Annual Meetings, Wall St. J., May 13, 1988, at 6, col. 1; Poison Pill Challenge Loses, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1987, at 23, col. 3 (natl. ed.). For a detailed description of one such fight, 
see Santa Fe Southern's Annual Meeting Features "Landmark" Poison Pill Vote, Wall St. J., May 
24, 1988, at 10, col. 1; Santa Fe Southern Holders Vote to Kill Poison Pill. Against Management 
Wishes, Wall St. J., May 25, 1988, at 3, col. 2; Santa Fe Southern Faces Thorny Issue of Whether 
to Accept Vote on Poison Pill. Wall St. J., May 26, 1988, at 10, col. 1. See generally P.L.I., 
SHAREOWNER ACTIVlSM: THE EMERGING ROLE OF INSTITUTlONAL INVESTORS (1987) [here-
inafter SHAREOWNER ACTIVlSM]. But see Camey, supra note 2; Camey, Two-Tier Tender Offers 
and Shark Repellents, 4 MIDLAND CoRP. FIN. J. 49 (1986) [hereinafter Camey, Two-Tier Tender 
Offers]. 
41. SEC, Office of the Chief Economist, Shark Repellents: The Role and Impact of An· 
titakeover Charter Amendments, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 83,714 
(Sept. 7, 1984). 
42. See Leebron, supra note 5, at 175-77 (noting anomaly that greater target shareholder 
gains are associated with tender offers than with mergers); Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Com-
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holder ends up with something that is readily measured in cash. In an 
any-or-all bid, tendering shareholders receive cash or other securities 
or some combination, while holdouts keep the stock they had. In a 
partial bid, the shareholder receives some cash and is left with some 
stock which can be sold for cash. The end result can quite easily be 
translated into cash. So why would the two results differ? That is, 
why would the shareholder be influenced to accept a lesser overall 
price simply because the bidder has chosen to employ a coercive bid? 
The usual answer is coercion itself, but that is not a wholly satisfactory 
explanation once it is understood by shareholders that the form of the 
bid affects overall returns. Why, after all, would even the first share-
holder willingly accept an offer which it is known will turn out to be 
inferior? And, by the same token, why would a bidder ever fail to use 
a two-tier or partial bid if shareholders are willing to accept such 
offers? 
An alternative explanation seems more likely, namely, that some 
shareholders do in fact receive higher premiums than others and that 
the blended premium paid in a coercive offer is in reality the second 
tier of an offer which began with private purchases prior to the public 
offer at the advertised first-tier price or an even higher price. This 
explanation could account for a systematic difference in premiums of-
fered from one sort of offer to another, as well as for bidders' ability to 
succeed at lower premiums in two-tier and partial offers. If sharehold-
ers realize that a disproportionate share of the available aggregate pre-
mium has been paid to earlier tenderers, they may settle for a smaller 
premium, not because they are happy with it, but because they believe 
that a higher premium cannot be negotiated. Similarly, shareholders 
may oppose defensive tactics designed to avert partial and two-tier of-
fers because such maneuvers may have the same effect. In other 
words, shareholders may recognize that a partial or two-tier offer is 
the best that can be expected under particular circumstances. This 
possibility suggests still another reason why coercive offers have not 
been banned. · 
C. The Open Market Alternative to Regulated Tender Offers 
Makes Banning Coercive Offers Futile 
Probably the most serious objection to a rule prohibiting coercive 
offers is that a bidder could easily avoid the rule by purchasing stock 
mon Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 807 (1987) (arguing that since dual-
class capitalization and management buyouts result in public shareholders receiving similar post-
transaction investments, explanation for discrepant returns must be found somewhere other than 
in form of transaction). 
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on the open market or privately from larger shareholders (unless of 
course the rule were combined with a seemingly unacceptable addi-
tional rule that required all large purchases to be made by tender of-
fer). Thus a rule against partial or two-tier bids would accomplish 
little and might do considerable harm since it would induce more bids 
designed to circumvent the Williams Act which might also deny many 
public shareholders the opportunity to tender. 
Professor Romano has offered a related explanation for why insti-
tutional investors frequently oppose charter amendments designed to 
discourage partial and two-tier bids. As she points out, it is well 
known that many tender offers begin with open market or private 
purchases designed to establish a beachhead from which to launch a 
public offer.43 Any shareholder who can expect regularly to be able to 
sell all of his or her shares at the first-tier premium without risking the 
possibility that only some shares will be accepted pro rata at the first-
tier price (the usual treatment faced by smaller public shareholders) 
will naturally oppose any effort to curtail such offers. Indeed, if the 
first-tier price tends to be higher than the average premium offered in 
an any-or-all offer, such a shareholder will clearly prefer two-tier of-
fers. Moreover, such a shareholder may even take steps to discourage 
the payment of too high premiums to other shareholders because of 
the recognition that there is only a finite amount of premium money to 
go around and that some of that which would go to relatively weakly 
positioned target shareholders can easily be diverted without jeopard-
izing the success of the offer.44 
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have made a similar point in 
connection with shareholder voting. As they note, the standard one-
share-one-vote model, which, at least until the recent past, had been 
followed by virtually all exchange-traded companies, serves in most 
situations to minimize agency costs by eliminating the ability of any 
one group of shareholders to make or force management decisions 
which serve their particular constituency to the detriment of other 
shareholders.45 Though their main point in this regard is that distrib-
uting hold-up potential or veto power too broadly creates difficulties in 
negotiation or conflict resolution generally, it seems a necessary corol-
43. See Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to Negotiated 
Corporate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1679 (1979); Tobin & Maiwurm, Beachhead Acquisitions: 
Creating Waves in the Marketplace and Uncertainty in the Regulatory Framework, 38 Bus. LAW. 
419 (1983); see also Andre, Unconventional Offers Under the Williams Act: The Case for Judicial 
Restraint, 11 J. CoRP. LAW 499 (1986). 
44. See Grundfest, supra note 3. 
45. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39; see also Leebron, supra note 5. 
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lary that anyone who has hold-up power, as a large holder of target 
shares might, is likely to use it. 
This account of coercion may at first seem overly ornate. Yet 
given the bad name which partial and two-tier offers have had from 
the beginning, it seems difficult to believe that a bidder would ever 
employ a two-tier bid which effectively holds itself out as inferior.46 It 
would seem more sensible, if only for purposes of public relations, to 
average the two premiums and offer a single price for the remainder of 
the shares. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the survival of co-
ercive bids. One is that the form of the bid is a method of advertising 
the strength of the bidder's position to target shareholders. It would 
be far easier, of course, for the bidder simply to state the effective or 
blended premium offered in the form of an any-or-all bid. But as pre-
viously noted, shareholders naturally suspect that any bidder is willing 
to pay more, that is, that the initial offer may be a "low ball" bid 
which will allow the bidder to capture more of the gains than neces-
sary to go ahead with the deal. However, by electing to structure the 
bid as a two-tier or partial offer, the bidder sends a signal that the price 
being offered, though lower than normal, is the best bid that is likely 
to be made, or that some of the aggregate premium being offered has 
already been diverted to early sellers. Thus the use of a "coercive" bid 
may be seen as a perverse form of bonding: The bidder chooses to 
employ a bid that on its face ought to be less appealing to sharehold-
ers, thus convincingly conveying the message that the offer is not 
likely to be raised by the bidder or bettered by another. 
The data lend support to this explanation. The fact that bidders on 
average make only ordinary returns means that excess returns must be 
directed elsewhere.47 If excess returns appear to be smaller in coercive 
bids, it must be because some part of the excess has been siphoned off. 
Perhaps more to the point, if bidders only make ordinary returns, they 
are likely to be much more reluctant to assume additional risk. The 
risk a bidder takes is not easily diversified. Although a shareholder 
can indulge a hunch and wait for a better bid even if by doing so some 
46. This, together with the ready availability of junk bond financing (see note 30 supra) may 
explain to some extent the less frequent use of two-tier offers by third-party bidders recently, but 
the fact that such bids are known to be inferior to other bids remains inconsistent with their use 
and success in connection with defensive buyout bids and dual class recapitalizations by manage-
ment. See Grundfest, supra note 3; Gilson, supra note 42. One possible explanation, however, is 
that shareholders expect lower premiums in management buyouts because the bid need not be 
high enough to satisfy management itself (or overcome any defenses since none will arise). See 
generally Booth, supra note 26. 
47. See note 24 supra. 
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bids are lost altogether, a bidder can ill afford such luxuries: The bid-
der requires considerable up front investment to locate a target and 
mount a bid.48 Yet employing an apparently coercive two-tier bid, 
which in effect announces that the price to be paid is inferior to the 
price that would be offered by an any-and-all bidder, would seem to be 
an unnecessary risk (assuming that anyone who makes a tender offer 
has a genuine interest in seeing it succeed).49 There must be some 
benefit associated with using such an offer. The benefit is most likely 
that shareholders are for some reason more inclined to accept it. 
Thus, there is even greater reason to believe a two-tier offer is an indi-
cation of an earlier bribe and that a coercive offer somehow conveys 
information about the adequacy of the price being offered. 
The disproportionate use of two-tier bids in such circumstances 
may also be explained as an effort to portray the offer as fairer than it 
really is. Conceivably, an offer that did not throw a bone to the public 
shareholders by soliciting some publicly held shares at prices as high 
as those paid to true first-tier offerees might be enjoined under state 
law on a theory akin to that of Perlman v. Feldmann, namely, that it is 
illegal for controlling shareholders to sell control at a premium with-
out sharing the premium with the public shareholders. so The fit is not 
exact, of course, since first-tier offerees are by definition not control-
ling shareholders. Nevertheless, one could fairly characterize a pri-
vate first-tier offer as a bribe to a select few shareholders who are in a 
position to make or break an offer. 
The foregoing explanations may seem somewhat Byzantine, but 
they are not out of proportion with the phenomenon they seek to ex-
plain, namely, that shareholders accept bids that are effectively adver-
tised as inferior. There is a surprising amount of evidence, albeit 
anecdotal, that these explanations are at least partially correct. In one 
notable case, a target con:ipany which had initially opposed a tender 
48. T. CoPELAND & J. WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 609-10 (2d 
ed. 1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1178-79; Berg, Talking Deals: Premium's 
Size in Takeovers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1987, at 30, col. 1 (natl. ed.). The trade-off between 
protecting the bidder's interest in information about an attractive target and maximizing the 
price paid to target shareholders is discussed at length in a trilogy of articles. Easterbrook & 
Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982); Bebchuk, The 
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV, 23 
(1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. 
L. REv. 51 (1982). Cf Leebron, supra note 5, at 194-97 (discussing possible reasons why auction 
might not arise). 
49. This is not always the case. Sometimes, perhaps often, an initial bidder is primarily inter-
ested in greenmail or inducing the target to find a white knight to whom the bidder's shares may 
then be tendered at a profit. See Stewart & Herzberg, Cutting Corners: Secret Dealing Helped 
Paul Bi/zerian Make Takeover Bids Work, Wall St. J., May 19, 1988, at 1, col. 6. Yet even in 
such cases the form of the bid ought to affect its credibility. 
50. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). 
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offer, acquiesced when it became apparent that the offer would suc-
ceed. 51 Bidder and target thereupon agreed that the original offer 
would be cancelled and that a new offer on similar terms would be 
made, thereby allowing additional shareholders of the target to tender 
their shares. The effect, however, was to reduce the proportion of 
shares purchased from shareholders who had tendered earlier. The 
Supreme Court ruled that such a tactic did not constitute manipula-
tion under the Williams Act and that the shareholders were not enti-
tled to relief. The relevant point for present purposes is that the 
tendering public shareholders received a smaller premium because of 
increased proration owing to intervening sales by a presumably more 
powerful and better organized shareholder group. 
In a slightly different vein, the SEC has recently seen fit to adopt a 
rule that requires tender offers to be made to all shareholders. 52 Ad-
mittedly, the impetus for the rule was the perception that a target 
could unfairly defend itself by making a tender offer for its own shares 
excluding those of the hostile bidder (as occurred in the battle for 
Unocal53). Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that the advantages of 
making a higher offer to some shareholders rather than a lower offer to 
all shareholders were not noticed earlier. Furthermore, the SEC has 
recently proposed a rule against "street sweeps," or the purchase of 
large blocks of shares from market professionals during or shortly af-
ter a tender offer. 54 Here too, the primary concern is unequal treat-
ment. The worry is that public shareholders are not afforded the same 
opportunity to sell their shares that market professionals enjoy. 
There is no reason to assume that favored treatment of certain 
stockholder groups does not also occur before a bid. There are ample 
data indicating that markets rise for days before a bid is publicly an-
nounced. 55 The simplest explanation for the typicajly observed pre-
51. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). 
52. Exchange Act Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1987). 
53. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The rule has been 
criticized as beyond the SEC's authority. See FERRARA, supra note 2, at 79-83; Comment, 
Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and the Al/-
Holders Rule Under the Federal Secun"ties Laws, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563 (1987); see also note 5 
supra. 
54. See Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securities and Related Activities Undertaken 
During and Following a Tender Offer for Those Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 24,976, 
(Oct. 1, 1987) [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 84, 160. 
55. See Carney, supra note 25, at 891-93; Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and 
Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981); SEC, Office of the 
Chief Economist, Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or 
Market Anticipation? (Feb. 24, 1987) (legitimate speculation explains much of pre-announcement 
run-up); see also The SEC's Fight with Itself, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1987, at 34, col. 1 (editorial); 
Unusual Stock Moves Continue to Raise Questions About Leaks, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1987, at 23, 
col. 4 .. 
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bid run-up is, of course, insider trading. It is likely, however, that the 
bidder's pre-announcement purchases in the open market are noticed 
by professional traders - if for no other reason than the increase in 
volume that they generate - and that the bid is thus anticipated by 
many traders who know nothing in particular about it (much as Vin-
cent Chiarella, the now famous (and acquitted) financial printer di-
vined the encoded targets in the tender offer forms he helped print56). 
Indeed Professors Gilson and Kraakman have named this process "de-
rivatively informed trading."57 
Sometimes, perhaps more often than not, takeover bids are con-
ceived and promoted by investment bankers who have no interest in 
assuming managerial control of the target company. That is, shares 
are frequently amassed in anticipation of finding someone to bid. It 
has been suggested that this trend developed because the merger and 
acquisition departments of investment banks had grown too large to 
depend solely on deals proposed by others. 58 There is nothing particu-
larly surprising, or necessarily sinister, about investment banks seeking 
to generate more of what has become a very profitable business. The 
point is that one would expect a good deal of activity to occur before a 
bid is publicly announced. And since maximizing profit depends on 
reselling as many acquired shares as possible at the highest possible 
price, one would expect a professional takeover intermediary, be it an 
investment bank or arbitrageur, to seek to sell its shares outside a two-
tier offer or wholly in the front end. Indeed, if public shareholders are 
averse to proration, it stands to reason that professional traders will do 
all they can to avoid it. 
There is thus every reason to think that institutional investors, who 
have been quite vociferous in their opposition to shark repellent 
amendments and other measures designed to reduce the incidence of 
partial and two-tier bids, 59 have taken steps to capture a dispropor-
tionate share of first-tier bids. Their efforts to seek and obtain reduced 
brokerage commissions while the rates were still supposedly fixed and 
their efforts to share in underwriting discounts in connection with new 
issues despite industry rules that required all public sales of securities 
to be at the same price are notorious and have led to legislation and 
rulemaking designed to confine such favored treatment to so-called 
56. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
57. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 25, at 572-79. 
58. See Investment Bankers Feed a Merger Boom And Pick Up Fat Fees, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 
1986, at 1, col. 6. 
59. See note 40 supra. 
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"soft dollar" discounts. 60 Why should things be different when it 
comes to tender offers? 
To sum up, shareholders may not benefit from all tender offers; in 
fact, the true problem of coercion seems likely to infect all offers as 
well as those that are coercive in form. While competition will likely 
mitigate or eliminate the effects of coercion in many cases, the fact 
remains that premiums are demonstrably lower in coercive bids. The 
upshot would seem to be that partial and two-tier offers are not so 
much the cause of coercion as they are an expression of the fact that 
premium money has been siphoned off by early tenderers. In short, 
there seems to be nothing to the threat of a coercive bid other. than the 
well advertised possibility of a smaller gain. Even if one is disinclined 
to believe such a story, one can see that banning partial or two-tier 
offers would have little effect but to induce bidders to direct their pre-
offer efforts and larger premiums to more substantial shareholders. 
The proposed SEC rule governing street sweeps, it bears noting, suffers 
from the same defects, suggesting perhaps that all sales of significant 
blocks of shares should be regulated as tender offers. Yet, federal reg-
ulation of private sales is difficult to imagine given the firmly en-
trenched philosophy of disclosure and the equally strong revulsion for 
substantive (or merit) regulation. The implication thus would seem to 
be that the tender offer process cannot be controlled by rules like the 
Williams Act. Indeed, the Williams Act may well cause some of these 
problems. 61 What shareholders need instead is some sort of collective 
60. See Steele & Lawton, Soft Dollar Practices, 19 REv. SEC. & CoMM. REG. 207 (1986); see 
also Pension Funds Feud with Money Managers Over Brokers' Rebates, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1984, 
at 1, col. 6. Similarly it appears that some investors are routinely favored over others in connec-
tion with the allocation of attractive new issues of securities. See The Obligations of Underwrit-
ers, Brokers and Dealers in Distributing and Trading Securities, Particularly of New High Risk 
Ventures, Exchange Act Release No. 9671, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 4506B (July 26, 1972); 
Miller & Monroe, Trading at Time of Stock Offerings Raises Questions of Manipulation, Wall St. 
J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 31, col. 4. Coincidentally, similar practices have recently come under fire in 
connection with the distribution of junk bonds to finance takeovers and buyouts. Smith, How 
Drexel Wields its Power in Market/or High-Yield Bonds, Wall St. J., May 26, 1988, at 1, col. 6; 
Nash, "Junk Bond" Policy Shift at Drexel, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1988, at 29, col. 3 (natl. ed.); 
Subcommittee Members, Drexel Clash on Drexel Officials' Trading Junk Bonds, 20 Sec. Reg. & 
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 636 (Apr. 29, 1988); Milken Pleads Fifth to Questions on Drexel 
Officials' Personal Bond Deals, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 640 (Apr. 29, 1988). 
Ironically, but not surprisingly, existing and proposed definitions of insider trading on the 
basis of nonpublic market information about planned tender offers exclude sales to the bidder 
itself. Sec. Exch. Act Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1987); SEC Submits Draft Legislative 
History to Accompany Insider Trading Proposal, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 252, 279 
(text) (Feb. 19, 1988). See also Banoun & Beier, Warehousing and Parking, 21 Rev. Sec. & 
Comm. Reg. 39 (1988). 
61. See Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control: Advance Notice 
of Possible Commission Actions, Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 84,018, at 88,201 (July 31, 1986) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release]; 
Expropriation at Home, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1987, at 18, col. 1 (editorial); R. Booth, supra note 5. 
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bargaining mechanism that allows them to extract some of the pre-
mium from true first-tier offerees. 62 As will be seen, the Indiana Con-
trol Share Acquisition Chapter is exactly that. 
D. A Ban on Coercive Offers Would Protect Larger Companies 
Which Benefit Most from the Discipline 
of Takeover Threats 
Fairness to shareholders aside, a rule against partial bids might 
unduly favor the incumbent management of larger companies. Even if 
a bidder ought to be able to borrow to finance the acquisition of a 
company that will be worth more after the takeover, it will be more 
difficult to put together the financing for larger deals. 63 Moreover, 
bigger targets and their shareholders are likely to be less susceptible to 
coercion. Coercion, after all, depends on the bidder's ability to pay a 
larger premium to early tenderers and to recoup the excess premium 
from holdouts either by operating the acquired company as a captive 
or by cashing out the remaining minority at a price which is depressed 
because of the threat of captive operation. Bigger companies are, 
other things equal, less susceptible to such threats. Bigger, more ma-
ture and established businesses are more likely, essentially, to run 
themselves. The bigger the business, the more likely it is to be inter-
nally diversified and thus resistant to operational changes that can re-
duce its value. 64 Bigger companies are more actively traded and thus 
more efficiently priced. Similarly, bigger targets are less likely to in-
crease or decrease dramatically in value for any reason, be it techno-
logical breakthrough or operation as a captive subsidiary. 
Admittedly, the motivation for many takeovers seems to be pre-
cisely that the target is overly diversified. Otherwise, the so-called 
bust-up takeover would not ~ave gained the prominence that it has. 65 
62. See SEC Advisory Comm. on Tender Offers, supra note 28. Professor Camey and Pro-
fessor Coffee have offered a slightly different explanation for why some shareholders may be 
more eager to tender and others more worried about coercion: Some shareholders are less diver-
sified than others and thus more concerned with the fortunes of particular companies. See Car-
ney, Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra note 40, at 51-53; Coffee, supra note 10, at 67-81. Baysinger 
& Butler, supra note 32, have also argued that the established relations some shareholders have 
with target companies lead them to support takeover defenses. See also Booth, supra note 26 
(fact that management has undiversified investment may generate genuine difference of opinion 
as to value of company and potential for real gain from going private). However, no one has as 
yet offered a very convincing explanation of why an investor (purely as an investor) would prefer 
to be less than fully diversified. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 67-68. But see note 32 supra. 
63. SEC, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra note 4, at 86,923-24. 
But see note 30 supra. 
64. See Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327 (1983). 
65. See Lipton, supra note 2; Lipton, Greenmail, Bust-Up Takeovers -A Discussion Memo-
randum, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 4. 
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In short, despite the earlier teachings of the business schools, diversifi-
cation may not always lead to higher value when real assets rather 
than financial assets are involved. 66 It is sometimes also argued that 
stocks of diversified companies are systematically undervalued be-
cause, since it is relatively cheap to diversify a portfolio of stocks, any 
effort to diversify across lines of business at the firm level is more 
costly and denies the investor the option to structure his or her portfo-
lio as he or she pleases. Additionally, analysts who follow diversified 
companies, it is argued, tend to specialize in the industry from which 
the company grew and have less appreciation for the value of other 
lines of business. 67 But the most likely explanation for why bidders 
prefer diversified companies is that the managers who carried out the 
diversification were motivated more by empire building than by 
profitability.68 · 
The idea that a diversified company may be more resistant to take-
over, then, requires explanation. Diversification comes in many forms. 
Diversification across lines of business seems to have led to the take-
over of many companies. 69 However, a business may also be diversi-
fied simply by virtue of bigness which may, for example, allow the 
business to self-insure against some risks, thus raising profitability.70 
But there is more to diversification than economies of scale. For ex-
ample, a business may be diversified by having a wide range of custom-
ers who themselves may be in a variety of businesses, rendering the 
supplier business less susceptible to volatility in its return. These sorts 
of diversification are clearly value-enhancing in that they reduce costs, 
66. See Coffee, supra note 10; Wayne, Management Gospel Gone Wrong, N.Y. Times, May 
30, 1982, § 3 (Business), at 1, col. 2. The Supreme Court itself in CTS expressly recognized 
growing doubts about the value of diversification of real assets: "[T]here is no reason to assume 
that the type of conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive takeovers necessarily 
will result is [sic] more effective management or otherwise be beneficial to shareholders." 107 S. 
Ct. at 1651 n.13 (emphasis in original). In the context of CTS, this statement must be interpreted 
as supportive of more restrictions on takeovers. It is, however, an equally good argument for a 
less restrictive regime with respect to those companies that are or are more likely to be overly 
diversified. Thus it seems all the more clear that what is needed is a flexible regulatory scheme 
which respects the different attributes of different companies. 
67. See Brooks, Some Concerns Find that the Push to Diversify Was a Costly Mistake, Wall St. 
J., Oct. 2, 1984, at 33, col. 4. 
68. Note, The Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A 
Portfolio Theory Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238 (1979). As I sketch elsewhere, finance theory 
suggests that some companies may be systematically undervalued in the market in the sense that 
they generate more return for less risk than the market will recognize for purposes of portfolio 
construction and management. For such companies - and there are presumably few if any of 
them - empire building may be acceptable at least in terms of market effects. See Booth, Junk 
Bonds, the Relevance of Dividends and the Limits of Managerial Discretion. 1987 CoLUM. Bus. L. 
REV. 553. 
69. See note 66 supra. 
70. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 64. 
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in the case of economies of scale, and the fluctuation or volatility of 
returns, in the case of customer diversity. Thus, other things being 
equal, these companies will find their stock valued higher in the mar-
ket. 71 In short, firms are better at some kinds of diversification and 
markets are better at others. Of course, the very fact that a smaller 
company tends to be less diversified may mean there is more to be 
gained by diversifying it, and thus more reason for its takeover and 
less reason for nonchalance in connection with its management's self-
defense. But aside from the fact that takeovers appear to be more mo-
tivated by the opposite problem of too much diversification, there is no 
reason whatever to think that the management of a smaller, develop-
ing company fails to appreciate the value of diversification or will fail 
to pursue it with alacrity. And given that diversification across lines 
of business has apparently prompted many takeovers, there is every 
reason to suspect the ability and motive of the bidder in the same 
connection. 
Professor Gilson has recently argued in a somewhat different con-
text that a company's choice of particular takeover defenses may be 
dictated by its stage of development. 72 He notes that mature compa-
nies are more likely to go private - an advance or preemptive defense 
- while growing companies are more likely to issue nonvoting stock 
or to undergo a recapitalization that reduces the voting rights of pub-
lic shareholders while preserving the option of raising additional eq-
uity capital. 73 As Gilson points out, the two transactions are quite 
equivalent in the sense that outside shareholders end up with an in-
vestment, whatever it may be called, that amounts to nonvoting com-
mon stock. 74 
Gilson surmises that the differing preferences are the result of dif-
fering agency costs present in the two types of firms. In the mature 
firm with few growth prospects and little need for new capital, man-
agement may be tempted to slack off and extract high salaries and 
benefits. Management need not please its shareholders except in order 
to avoid a takeover. In a company with growth potential, however, 
management appreciates the value of a dollar (as the saying goes). In 
such a company, management's interests are likely to coincide with 
that of the shareholders. Not only is there every reason to keep the 
shareholders happy and the stock's price up in order to raise needed 
71. On the relationship between risk and return, see generally J. LoRIE, P. DODD & M. 
KIMPTON, supra note 32, at 13-24. 
72. Gilson, supra note 42. 
73. Id. at 823-32. 
74. Id. at 811-15. 
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new capital at the lowest possible price, there are also good reasons to 
work hard and to keep salaries and perquisites to a minimum if such 
forgone consumption can, in effect, be reinvested in the company itself 
at presumably attractive returns, to be withdrawn later as deferred 
compensation. 75 The preference of mature companies and their share-
holders for management buyouts and of growth companies and their 
shareholders for dual-class capitalization can thus be understood as a 
direct result of differing agency costs. The shareholders in the growth 
company are unconcerned about management's agenda and are rela-
tively happy to trade in their voting stock for nonvoting stock, while 
the shareholders in the mature company require a firmer commitment, 
either in the form of junk bonds or cash, because they have reason to 
suspect management's enthusiasm. 76 
The differences that Professor Gilson has outlined apply equally 
well to takeover defenses generally: If managers of growing compa-
nies have few conflicts of interest with their shareholders, they are 
much more justified in resisting a takeover. Moreover, the takeover is 
more likely to depend on coercive techniques, since the offered pre-
mium is less likely to be justified by slack management under the cur-
rent regime. At the very least, there is reason to believe that the 
problem of coercion is not the same for every potential target com-
pany. Indeed, for larger companies it may be no problem at all. 
III. DEFENSIVE REsPONSES TO COERCION 
While it is somewhat artificial to describe as coercion a share-
holder's inclination to sell out for less than the maximum premium, it 
is not an unreasonable characterization, given that nothing really mat-
ters to an investor other than risk and return. Most investors under-
stand fairly well that the market cannot be beaten without inside 
information. 77 Thus, when a bidder offers a premium, there is no good 
reason not to take it, and there is certainly no good reason to wait for 
the smaller back-end premium if the bid is likely to succeed in shifting 
control. In other words, that target shareholders might benefit from 
some sort of mechanism which allows them to recapture the extra part 
of the aggregate premium that true first-tier offerees receive is no rea-
son not to take an inferior bid, provided there are reasons to believe 
the inferior bid is the best that can be expected. 
Standing alone, the possibility that shareholders might reap too lit-
75. Id. at 815-32. 
76. Id. at 823-27. 
77. See J. LoRIE, P. DODD & M. KIMPTON, supra note 32, at 65-77; Bebchulc, The Pressure 
to Tender, supra note 2. 
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tle from takeovers (and that the capital markets are rendered margin-
ally inefficient) is not a particularly convincing reason for additional 
regulation or substantial reform. But reduced returns for shareholders 
are not the only cost of coercion. In some cases, part of the motivation 
for a takeover can come from the ability of a bidder to cancel or rene-
gotiate contracts with managers, employees, or other groups, or to un-
dertake strategies that transfer we~th away from senior creditors. As 
Professor Coffee has argued, legitimate claims against the corporation 
may be compromised for the benefit of shareholders. His argument is 
not simply that communities, for example, may be hurt by business 
dislocations and consequent unemployment and loss of tax basis -
though those are certainly real costs which are usually ignored in the 
academic debate over the wisdom of takeovers. Rather, Professor 
Coffee's focus is on managers who may be forced out without compen-
sation in the event of a successful takeover. He argues that managers 
depend on deferred compensation, which they have, in effect, accepted 
as a sort of bond insuring their best efforts on behalf of the sharehold-
ers. Thus, a hostile takeover may be an opportunity for shareholders 
to renege on their end of the deferred compensation deal: The bidder 
effectively bribes the target shareholders to sell out management and 
pays the bribe from part of the savings generated by cancelling de-
ferred claims. 78 
Viewed as a financial claim on the firm, the manager's interest may 
be likened to a large, undiversified (and undiversifiable) investment. 
Since the manager cannot diversify (in most cases he or she will not be 
wealthy enough to invest in several different ventures to the extent of 
his or her implicit investment in the firm in question), the potential 
target manager (and all companies are potential targets) is forced to 
bear more risk than the shareholders, who can easily diversify, and is 
legitimately motivated to take extraordinary steps to reduce that risk, 
as by adopting takeover defenses. As Coffee points out, similar argu-
ments can be made for other constituencies such as employees and 
bondholders. 79 Presumably each of these groups has a legitimate in-
78. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 23-24. 
79. See id. at 16-24; McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 
(1986); McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CoRP. L. 205 (1988); Murdoch, Sartin & 
Zadek, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Transfers: Life After Gleneagles, 43 Bus. Law. 1 
(1987); Kirby, McGuiness & Kandel, Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged Buyout 
Lending, 43 Bus. Law. 27 (1987); Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1987); Booth, Book Review, 57 u. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (review-
ing FERRARA, supra note 2); Much & O'Dea, LBOs and the Risk of Fraudulent Com•eyance, 
Natl. L.J., Nov. 3, 1987, at 36, col. 1. A recent study by Commissioner Grundfest of the SEC 
apparently indicates, however, that tenders offers do not in fact reduce the wealth of securities 
holders other than stockholders. See Grund/est Says Study Shows Takeovers Sharply Increase 
Shareholder Wealth, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1487 (Oct. 2, 1987). 
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terest in preserving its stake in the company. For example, a manager 
who has agreed to assume a position with the target company and has 
agreed to defer a portion of his or her compensation as a way of bond-
ing performance, has every legitimate interest in preventing the com-
pany from breaching the deal. Although it is arguable that target 
managers' efforts to thwart takeover of the company constitute self-
dealing and thus violate their fiduciary duties to maximize shareholder 
wealth and forgo self-aggrandizement, managers also have a contract 
with the company on which the company has a duty to perform. Pre-
sumably, management's job is to see that this contract, like other con-
tracts, is fulfilled. On the other hand, it can also be argued that it 
should be up to management to anticipate such risks and negotiate for 
contractual protections. 
Aside from management's legitimate self-interest in avoiding take-
over in some circumstances, management does not and should not rea-
son in the same way a passive (and diversified) investor reasons in 
reacting to a takeover attempt. Whether one focuses on the manager's 
desire to keep her job in the present or to keep it long enough to enjoy 
whatever deferred compensation may be expected, both of which are 
legitimate goals within limits, management's stake in the company is a 
nondiversified investment and is not valued the way a passive investor 
in financial instruments would value it. Management's concern is not 
with how its investment performs after being averaged with a collec-
tion of other investments. Rather, management's goal is to maximize 
the value of the real assets under its charge. And shareholders expect 
management to do just that, notwithstanding the fact that the invest-
ment is ordinarily priced in the market by the interaction of investors 
who only care about its value as part of a portfolio. 80 Even if it is 
somewhat artificial to say that a shareholder can be coerced by a pre-
mium that is too small, management certainly can be coerced by a 
bidder who offers a small premium to target shareholders who are ef-
fectively compelled to accept it. Thus, as matters currently stand - at 
least under federal law - partial and two-tier bids remain legal and 
target management must protect itself, the shareholders, and the com-
pany against coercive bids as well as take an active role in negotiating, 
by means of defensive tactics or otherwise, the highest price possible. 
Early takeover defenses were simple and innocuous by today's 
80. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 68-73. Regarding the importance of diversification as a 
matter of investment strategy, see J. LoRIE, P. DODD & M. KIMPTON, supra note 32, at 132-43. 
As for the idea that management (or other constituencies for that matter) may place a different 
value on an enterprise because they hold a nondiversified investment in it (usually necessarily), 
see Booth, supra note 26; Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra note 40; Gilson, supra note 42. 
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standards. Many companies adopted charter amendments which re-
quired any second-step merger be consummated at a fair price or at 
the same price paid in the front-end tender offer, or which required a 
supermajority vote to approve a merger, or both. 81 Such charter 
amendments were reasonably effective against two-tier offers. But 
they were arguably redundant where state law provided for careful 
judicial scrutiny of the terms of second-step mergers or allowed the 
remaining shareholders to vote on the adequacy of the offer. 82 And 
none of this did anything to discourage partial offers. If a bidder was 
content to gain control and to postpone any merger indefinitely, these 
defenses and protections were neutralized. And indeed, for that rea-
son they may have encouraged partial bids. There are, however, at 
least two tactics - both severely criticized - which are quite effective 
· against partial bids. 
A. Greenmail 
The first tactic, which predates even the Williams Act, is green-
mail, or the repurchase by a target company - typically at a premium 
- of the target stock acqdred by a bidder or potential bidder. 83 The 
potential abusiveness of greenmail is easy to see. Not only are remain-
ing target shareholders denied the opportunity to tender at a profit in 
the offer that is averted, but target management typically uses corpo-
rate funds - shareholder wealth - to buy off the bidder. 84 Target 
shareholders thus appear to lose twice. Partial bids, however, offer at 
least a theoretical justification for greenmail. Greenmail may serve the 
interests of holdout shareholders if they stand to lose more by a trans-
fer of control than the premium they must pay the bidder to desist. 
The fact that greenmail can be beneficial to shareholders is consistent 
with empirical evidence. Although often the price of the target's stock 
declines after a repurchase to a level below that prevailing before the 
greenmailer began buying, on the average the decline in price is re-
markably slight, and in many cases the stock continues to trade at 
prices higher than before the greenmailer began purchasing. 85 
81. See SEC, Shark Repellents: The Role and Impact of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 
supra note 41. 
82. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 Mo. L. REV. 517 (1984). 
83. See Chelf v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
84. See FERRARA, supra note 2, at 413-23; Lipton, supra note 2; Gilson, supra note 3; Macey 
& McChesney, supra note 3; Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Manage-
ment-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1985). 
85. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 3, at 43-48. But see SEC, Office of the Chief Econo-
mist, The Impact of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock Prices, [1984-85 Transfer 
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The fact that greenmail may serve a legitimate end is, however, 
nothing to celebrate. It means that target management is largely free 
to use the device whenever a colorable case for potential coercion can 
be made out. And that means that management is largely free to use 
greenmail to preserve its control regardless of detriment to share-
holder wealth. It is thus impossible to generalize about the benefits or 
harms of greenmail. The one thing that does seem certain is that as 
long as partial and two-tier tender offers are legal, greenmail can be 
beneficial from a shareholder point of view. Quite clearly, however, it 
would be preferable to regulate tender offers directly in a way that 
would eliminate the abuses - both offensive and defensive - that 
arise from partial and two-tier bids, rather than scrutinize on a case-
by-case basis the responses devised by (or for) target managers. 
B. Poison Pills 
A more recent but equally criticized defensive tactic is the evil-
sounding poison pill. 86 \Vith a typical poison pill, the target distrib-
utes to shareholders a dividend of warrants which gives each share-
holder the right, in the event a hostile bidder acquires a fixed 
percentage of the target's stock, to buy additional shares of the com-
pany at a discount, possibly even below the market price prevailing 
before a bid is announced. 87 A bidder who acquires 50% of a com-
pany which has distributed rights for the purchase of, say, five dis-
counted shares for each share held, would find that the remaining 
shares together with the triggered rights now constitute a 300% inter-
est relative to the bidder's stake, reducing what appeared to be an ac-
quired 50% voting position to approximately 14%. Faced with such a 
poison pill, the bidder would need to acquire something between 85% 
and 90% of the target's stock (together with the warrants attributable 
to it) to be assured that the holdouts would not be able to retain con-
trol of the company. In effect, a poison pill operates like a 
supermajority voting requirement, except that it works not only in 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 83,713 (Sept. 11, 1984); Forman, Greenmail Isn't Always 
Blackmail, Wall St. J., May 7, 1987, at 30, col. 3. 
86. See FERRARA, supra note 2, at 337-74; Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 3; Note, 
Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The ''Poison Pill" Preferred, 
supra note 3; SEC, Office of the Chief Economist, A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills, 
[1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 83,971 (Mar. 5, 1986). It has been sug-
gested that the Supreme Court's decision upholding the Indiana takeover law may actually have 
encouraged a new form of poison pill. See Labaton, Business and the Law: More Potency for 
Poison Pills, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1987, at 22, col. 1 (natl. ed.). On the other hand, the availabil-
ity of pre-packaged state takeover laws may encourage the courts to strike down customized 
defenses. See text at note 225 infra. 
87. See Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Intl., Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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connection with a merger but also in the ordinary exercise of other 
control devices, such as voting for directors. 
While one might object to a poison pill simply because it is 
designed to thwart takeovers, the typical poison pill does not block a 
takeover if the bidder is willing to buy a large enough percentage of 
target shares. Few if any investors would exercise their warrants if the 
bidder appeared likely to succeed. To do so would simply result in 
holding a larger minority interest under the bidder's control. Thus, 
the successful bidder is not likely to find that after paying for, say, 
90% of the target there remains another 60% to freeze out (that is, the 
original 10% together with the additional "50%" of the stock that the 
10% holdouts could have purchased in the example given). And even 
if the bidder did find that the holdouts had all exercised their rights, 
there would always remain the option simply to cancel the second-step 
merger. Thus, from the target shareholder's point of view, exercising 
one's warrants in connection with a bid that is likely to succeed is 
equivalent to opting into the neglected end of a partial tender offer.BB 
The more serious objection would seem to be that the typical 
poison pill allows holdout shareholders to buy additional shares at 
bargain basement prices. B9 Such a tactic might at first seem every bit 
as objectionable as the target'~ selling off valuable assets. On reflec-
tion, however, it seems apparent that the poison pill simply allows the 
target to fight fire with fire. Partial and two-tier bids derive their coer-
cive power from the threatened transfer of wealth from holdouts to 
tenderers. The poison pill may be a way of transferring the same 
wealth back to the holdouts - thus assuring equal treatment of all 
shareholders - by the simple expedient of giving the holdouts more 
stock. 
The fact that shares are being sold or distributed for less than the 
price bid in the wake of the tender offer is not necessarily objectionable 
in circumstances where the holdouts may end up with shares worth 
even less than before the offer. (The same argument may also justify 
the sale of large blocks of stock to friendly bidders who intervene in a 
hostile takeover or fear that competition may arise as a result of their 
own first bid.90) Admittedly, allowing sales of stock at apparently bar-
88. This risk may lower the percentage of stock a bidder must acquire in order to avoid the 
effects of a poison pill, since in close cases a potential holdout would probably decline to invest 
more in the target company. 
89. See Gearhart, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Oesterle, The Negotiation Model, supra note 
36, at 131-32. 
90. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). FERRARA, supr(l note 2, at 466-85; 
Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. 
REv. 315 (1987); Lamb & Turezyn, Revlon and Hanson Trust: Unlocking the Lock-Ups, 12 
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gain prices in the context of a hostile takeover - whether in connec-
tion with a poison pill or otherwise - creates an opportunity for abuse 
by target managers who are willing to defend at any cost to the com-
pany and shareholders. And it may be that managers who choose to 
employ poison pills and other defensive sales of stock should bear the 
burden in court of demonstrating that the price received is fair.91 The 
central point remains that the mere fact stock is being sold for less 
than the tender offer price is not conclusive when it occurs in response 
to a partial or two-tier offer. 
There is, however, a genuine difficulty with poison pills which has 
gone largely unrecognized: They allow target managers virtually full 
discretion to set the percentage ownership necessary for takeover. A 
poison pill which requires too high a percentage of shareholders to 
tender effectively requires the bidder to pay too much for the com-
pany. In the end, there will be fewer than the optimal number of 
tender offers, a lower level of investment by investors denied this as-
pect of return, and a higher cost of capital for business. On the other 
hand, investors may on balance lose less as a result of this feature of 
poison pills than they do when partial and two-tier bids are freely em-
ployed. In either event, it would be preferable for target managers to 
exercise some restraint in setting the terms of poison pills to avoid 
requiring a percentage offer that is too high. The problem, of course, 
is that it is probably impossible when adopting a poison pill to know 
just how much harm potential holdouts are likely to suffer in a bid 
that has not yet been made. Thus poison pills, like greenmail, are no 
doubt used to entrench management. 
In the end, this aspect of balancing in the poison pill defense makes 
it potentially desirable. The poison pill is not an absolute bar to take-
over. Rather it allows the target company to decide what percentage 
of stock ownership by the bidder is adequate to offset the likely harm 
to holdouts. Thus the initially surprising judicial response to poison 
pills - that they are legal as long as they are appropriate to the per-
ceived threat92 seems quite sensible. Still, poison pills do have costs, 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 497 (1987); Nachbar, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 
The Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contested Mergers, and its Effect on Lock-Ups and 
Other Bidding Deterrents, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 473 (1987); Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a 
State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1068 (1983). 
91. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML 
SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Inc., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 
1985); Oesterle, The Negotiation Model, supra note 36. · 
92. See Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). But see Dynamics Corp. 
of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 258-59 (7th Cir. 1986) (opinion by Posner, J., arguing that 
threshold less than majority was by definition too low), revd. in part, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). 
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as documented in another recent SEC study.93 For one, they leave no 
room for good-faith partial offers. They may even chill the prospect of 
eminently fair two-step equal price offers, since in practice all target 
shareholders must exercise whatever rights they receive - if any exer-
cise their rights - in order to avoid the effects of dilution in the value 
of pre-bid shares. 
IV. STATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION 
Up to now, federal law has failed completely to deal with any of 
these problems. The Williams Act's antifraud and manipulation pro-
vision does not reach partial or two-tier bids or the defensive tactics 
that arise in response to such bids. 94 Several proposals for reform are 
being debated at present, and it is once again suggested that federal 
corporation law may be on the way in response to the perceived short-
comings of state law and stock exchange regulation.95 But any reform 
at the federal level will probably follow the traditional disclosure 
theme and eschew any direct interference with the state law of corpo-
rations.96 Such disclosure-based reforms seem bound to fail. The 
problems with tender offers have little to do with information and dis-
closure. They have instead to do with the distribution of gains. Dis-
93. SEC, A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills, supra note 86. 
94. See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. 
Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984). But see Pryor v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 794 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 445 (1986) (bidder's extension of 
Williams Act proration deadline held actionable); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 
366 (6th Cir. 1981) (two-tier offer held manipulative). 
95. See Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutiona/ization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in 
Corporation Law, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 29 (1987); Karmel, Will Takeover Abuses Lead to Federal 
Corporation Law?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 1. In December, the Tender Offer Disclo· 
sure and Fairness Act of 1987 was introduced in the Senate. S. 1323, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 
17, 1987. See SENATE TENDER OFFER REPORT, supra note 8. The bill would, among other 
things, reduce the IQ.day window under § 13(d) to 5 days (and prohibit additional purchases 
prior to filing), would require a waiting period of 60 days in the case of a bidder who first dis· 
closes a passive investment intent and then decides to make a bid for control, would increase 
penalties for failure to disclose, would allow the SEC to seek civil penalties of up to 50% of the 
value of the stock at issue, would limit greenmail by allowing the paying company to recover any 
premium over 3%, would require more extensive registration of arbitrageurs, would give the 
SEC authority to promulgate regulations regarding Chinese Walls between various departments 
of brokerage houses and investment banks and would increase penalties for insider trading and 
obstruction of insider trading investigations. See also SEC to Impose Voting Rights Rule, A ban· 
dons Effort/or Industry Agreement, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 812 (June 5, 1987); 
SEC Concept Release, supra note 61; note 53 supra. 
96. See SENATE TENDER OFFER REPORT, supra note 8, at 51-54 (rejecting both preemption 
of state takeover laws and imposition of federal one-share-one-vote rule); The Battle Over Tender 
Offer Reform: From the States and the Courts to Congress. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, 
at 60 (Jan. 15, 1988); Proxmire Urges SEC to Postpone Action on Sharholder Voting Rights Propo-
sal, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 674 (May 6, 1988); SEC to Delay Final Action on 
Disenfranchisement Proposal 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1719 (Nov. 13, 1987); 
Senate Panel Approves Takeover Bill, Is Neutral on State Antitakeover Laws, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1479 (Oct. 2, 1987). 
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closure-based federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court simply 
does not address fairness. 97 
It is (or once was) arguable that the value of disclosure depends on 
the existence of a reasonable opportunity to negotiate or a fair market 
mechanism. To circumvent an open negotiation or auction, for exam-
ple, by forcing a shareholder to sell in a going private merger with full 
disclosure but at an unfair price is arguably the equivalent of fraud.98 
The argument applies, with appropriate changes, in the tender offer 
context. Indeed, it is particularly strong in connection with tender 
offers since the Williams Act not only mandates disclosure but also 
sets ground rules by which the auction is to be conducted. Thus, even 
though it is well established that federal antifraud law applies only if 
some failure to disclose is shown, the Williams Act arguably reaches 
issues of fairness and in particular issues of fairness arising from the 
form of a tender offer. 
The Supreme Court has, however, foreclosed any such line of de-
velopment in the law. And it seems highly unlikely that any congres-
sional fine-tuning of either disclosure rules or ground rules can give 
the federal courts the authority to fashion creative remedies for the 
problems of coercion.99 It is also far from clear that it would be desir-
able to rework the Williams Act ground rules in any fundamental way. 
It is at least arguable that the Williams Act causes many of the appar-
ent problems requiring further regulation. For example, but for the 
Williams Act, tender offer arbitrage might not have grown to the pro-
portions it has. 100 It is also suggested that the Williams Act has had 
the effect of raising premiums paid to shareholders, 101 which, though 
97. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462 (1977). But see Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1069 (1978). 
98. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
Regarding two-tier offers in particular, the advantage enjoyed by larger shareholders, see Ro-
mano, supra note 2, at 129-30, 170-80, might also be thought of as inside information - not 
necessarily as to anything in particular about the value of the target company but simply as to 
the fact that whenever a takeover arises the chances are good that news will reach the larger 
shareholder first. See id. at 177-78. But see Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Infonnational Ad-
vantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979). 
99. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); note 5, supra. For other 
examples of cases in which the Williams Act has been narrowly interpreted, see Hanson Trust 
PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985); Rado) v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985); 
SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985). Cf Langevoort, Statutory 
Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking 
Regulation, 85 MICH. L. RE.v. 672 (1987). 
100. See R. Booth, supra note 5. 
101. See Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash 
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 371 (1980); T. COPELAND & J. WESTON, supra note 48, at 605-
10. 
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good news for shareholders in the short run, may mean that more 
tender offers have resulted in the breakup of the target company. 
Moreover, each new reform of the rules has a tendency to create an-
other problem. For example, the SEC's adoption of rules extending 
withdrawal rights and eliminating proration pools may have induced 
more two-tier bids. 102 And the currently contemplated rule against 
street sweeps, that is, the purchase of large blocks of shares from arbi-
trageurs after cancellation of a tender offer, 103 is likely to discourage 
statutory tender offers and encourage tactics designed to concentrate 
shares that may be swept up. Finally, and perhaps most important, 
federal reform seems doomed to fail since the most potent weapons on 
both sides - freezeouts, poison pills, and greenmail - arise directly 
from powers firmly entrenched in state law. Thus state law would 
seem to be a more promising source of reform. 
A. The Motives Behind State Legislation 
Although there are several different models of second-generation 
statutes, they have been criticized as a group for a variety of reasons. 
Professor Coffee has argued that state takeover statutes are flawed by 
the "pretense that they are intended only to 'protect' shareholders." 104 
As he sees it, target shareholders enjoy the biggest part of the gains 
from takeovers and those gains may even be at the expense of other 
constituencies of the corporation. Thus, in his view, statutes which 
restrict takeovers are designed to protect shareholders, but are actually 
intended to protect other interests, such as those of middle managers, 
employees, creditors, and the community as a whole, from what might 
be characterized as overreaching by shareholders anxious to sell out 
for a quick profit. 105 In Coffee's view, then, state takeover statutes are 
a response to the needs of managers and others who are unable to 
adopt adequate defenses without legislative help. His position is that 
state takeover statutes may be properly motivated but are flawed be-
cause they seek to address the legitimate concerns of other constituen-
cies by regulating the takeover process as between shareholders and 
bidders. 106 
While these arguments have merit, they do not dispose of the need 
102. See Mirvis, supra note 29, at 485. 
103. See note 54 supra. Blanc, Commission Proposes to Outlaw Market Sweeps, Natl. L.J., 
Nov. 9, 1987, at 28, col. 1. 
104. Coffee, supra note 10, at 108. 
105. See id. at 31-35. Anyone who has worked for a major law firm should understand the 
fragility of the nexus and thus the aptness of the web metaphor, especially if one has the opportu-
nity as did I to witness its almost spontaneous disintegration. 
106. Id. at 104-08. 
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to insure a fair outcome as between shareholders and bidders in take-
over contests. The fact that shareholders in the aggregate may be 
overcompensated deserves attention. Perhaps some wholly new form 
of regulation designed to slow or even reverse the transfer of wealth to 
common stockholders should be enacted (though one would assume 
private contracting could take care of this problem in fairly short or-
der). There is, however, no reason not to perfect the mechanism by 
which takeover contests are decided as between rival managers. More-
over, the problems managers face in protecting their investment in the 
target arise at least in part because shareholders are coerced (or 
tempted) by inadequate offers. Thus, perfecting the auction process by 
which corporate control is bought and sold addresses at least part of 
the problem faced by management and is preferable to no solution at 
all. Finally, it is desirable, other things being equal, to assure that 
shareholders are fully compensated in connection with any takeover, 
rather than leaving too much of the gain on the table for bidders to 
appropriate. After all, it is bidders who initiate takeovers, and the 
more of the gain they can appropriate, the more they will appropriate. 
It is also argued that the true motivation for state takeover statutes 
is the prospect of gain to the enacting state at the expense of other 
states. Since takeover statutes are generally thought to raise the cost 
of acquisitions, a state with a larger proportion of potential target 
companies might enact a statute to force higher bids for its companies, 
which would tend either to keep domestic corporations independent or 
raise disproportionately the premiums enjoyed by the state's resi-
dents.107 The obvious problem with this argument is that a takeover 
statute is just as likely to backfire by rendering protected companies 
sufficiently less attractive as targets that investors in those companies 
will lose a disproportionate number of lucrative opportunities to 
tender their shares. Indeed, companies which find their stock slump-
ing because of such a statute might well move to a jurisdiction without 
one. The argument cannot be totally discounted, since shortsighted-
ness may be endemic in the legislative process. 108 Nonetheless, even if 
true, such motivations are no cause for worry if the market is efficient 
in factoring untoward protections into market prices. Many commen-
tators have taken the extemality argument quite seriously, however. 109 
107. See Romano, supra note 2, at 138-41. 
108. Id. at 135-36. 
109. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. in part, 
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 9; Coffee, supra note 10, at 93-103; see 
also Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 251, 268, 287-89 (1977). Indeed, the focus of the Supreme Court's recent decision in CTS 
as well as the earlier decision in MITE was on whether state takeover statutes unduly burdened 
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Finally, Professor Romano has argued that state takeover statutes 
may be adopted at the behest of potential target corporations which 
are reluctant to propose the defenses embodied in the statutes to their 
own shareholders. In some cases, when there is a perceived need for 
immediate action, the potential target may find that the state legisla-
ture can react more quickly, surely, or cheaply (believe it or not), since 
a high-profile special shareholders meeting is typically required for 
quick action by the company. The potential target may also worry 
that proposing a defensive charter amendment is inconsistent with 
political positions the company has taken in the past. Professor Ro-
mano offers the very believable example of the Aetna Life Insurance 
Company, concerned that it might soon be the subject of a hostile bid, 
pressing the Connecticut legislature to adopt a takeover statute, in 
part because the company, as a major institutional investor, had gone 
on record against the adoption of defenses by companies in which it 
invests. Simply put, target management may fear embarrassment or 
may even figure, sometimes correctly, that the shareholders simply 
will not approve the amendment. 110 Ultimately, Professor Romano 
herself is not completely convinced that this process implies that take-
over statutes are a sly way for potential target companies to gain de-
fenses which reduce shareholder wealth by overprotecting 
management. 111 As she recognizes, and as has been sketched here al-
ready, takeover defenses may make sense for some companies depend-
ing on size and ownership and may be abusive for others. 112 The basic 
question is whether and how a statute responds to the varying needs of 
varying companies. 
B. The Varieties of State Statutes 
The new statutes have taken five distinct forms. 113 For the most 
part, they address matters - such as shareholder voting and organic 
changes - that have traditionally been governed by state law.114 Un-
like the first-generation statutes, the new statutes generally apply only 
to firms incorporated in the enacting state which also have a signifi-
interstate commerce. There was little else for the Court to review and it may well be that much 
of the commentary which focused on the externality question did so not because it was especially 
convincing but because the Supreme Court was expected to agree with the multitude of lower 
courts that had struck down second-generation statutes. See note 13 supra. 
110. Romano, supra note 2, at 129-31. 
111. See id. at 145-48. 
112. Id. at 170-87. See also Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra note 40. 
113. See Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 9; see also Garrity, supra note 8 (noting a possible 
sixth type in the Wisconsin scaled voting statute). 
114. Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 9, at 340. 
June 1988] State Takeover Statutes 1671 
cant presence in the state or a relatively large proportion of sharehold-
ers resident in the state.115 
Many states have adopted more than one of the new style statutes, 
sometimes with differing standards as to what companies are covered, 
creating a bewildering array of combinations and permutations. For 
example, Indiana itself has adopted both a control share statute (re-
quiring a shareholder vote to enfranchise any bidder who acquires 
more than 20% of a target's shares) with an appraisal remedy for dis-
senters116 and a fair price statute (requiring that the price in a second-
step merger be the highest price paid for previously acquired shares) 
with a five-year merger prohibition (banning any combination between 
a target company and an interested shareholder for five years).117 The 
fair price and five-year rules apply automatically only to companies 
registered under the federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
(which generally means companies with $5 million or more in assets 
and 500 or more shareholders),118 while the control share statute ap-
plies to companies with one hundred or more shareholders and with 
headquarters or significant assets in Indiana or 10% or 10,000 of its 
shareholders resident there. 119 Under both statutes, companies that 
are covered may opt out while companies that are not covered may 
opt in. 120 All this means that companies with more than 100 but less 
than 500 shareholders, for example, are covered only by the control 
share statute. As for larger companies, there are presumably only a 
very few which meet all the criteria for coverage. Nevertheless, it may 
be difficult - absent voluntary disclosure by the company or a new 
rule by the SEC - for an investor to know with certainty which com-
panies are subject to which statutes. Notwithstanding the confusion, 
but mindful of the fact that more than one statute may operate as to 
any particular company, the individual statutes are relatively simple 
and have distinctive advantages and disadvantages. They are identi,. 
fied here with the state in which they first appeared. 
115. See Sargent, supra note 10, at 16-22. 
116. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1987). 
117. IND. CODE ANN.§§ 23-1-43-1 to -24 (West Supp. 1987). 
118. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43-20 (West Supp. 1987). See Exchange Act Rule 12g-l, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12g-l (1987). 
119. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (West Supp. 1987). These requirements suggest that the 
Indiana statute and others like it may apply for the most part to companies with disproportionate 
numbers of undiversified shareholders, who for that very reason have more to lose from a take-
over at an inadequate price. 
120. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-S; § 23-1-43-22 (West Supp. 1987). 
1672 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1635 
1. Disclosure Statutes 
Minnesota has adopted a statute that is similar to the statute 
struck down in Edgar v. MITE Corp. in that it sets up a state-level 
disclosure process akin to that of the Williams Act. 121 The Minnesota 
legislature took pains, however, to avoid the constitutional infirmities 
which led to preemption of the Illinois Act in MITE. Thus, the new 
Minnesota statute does not provide for any pre-offer notification. 122 
Moreover, it permits only the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce 
and not the target company to call a fairness hearing and does not 
allow the Commissioner to pass on the merits of the offer. 123 The new 
statute does not delay the tender offer process beyond the federal time-
table.124 Finally, it applies only if 20% or more of the target com-
pany's shareholders are residents of Minnesota, and it provides for the 
suspension of the offer only as to Minnesota residents. 125 
The obvious criticism of the Minnesota disclosure statute is that it 
adds little if anything to the Williams Act, except the possible uncer-
tainty of politically motivated administrative review, and it puts Min-
nesota shareholders at a potential disadvantage in the case of heavily 
subscribed offers. Indeed, a savvy bidder might well use the Minne-
sota statute to achieve a takeover at a lower aggregate price. For ex-
ample, by declining to comply with the Minnesota statute and having 
the bid enjoined as to Minnesota residents, the bidder is able, in effect, 
to restrict the offer to the residents of other states, and might therefore 
be able to offer a greater premium (though it is conceivable that the 
SEC's all holders rule would operate in such a case to prevent the bid 
from proceeding as to any target shareholders126). 
On the other hand, state-level disclosure is not without merit. It is 
entirely likely that hostile takeovers generate measurable social costs, 
such as unemployment, that fall disproportionately on particular geo-
121. See Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 9, at 340-44. The statute has been held constitu-
tional on its face by the Eighth Circuit. Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th 
Cir. 1984). Minnesota has also adopted a control share statute similar to the Indiana statute. 
See Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 9, at 349-52. That statute was struck down in Card{!]' 
primarily because it applied even if none of the target shareholders were Minnesota residents. 
Connecticut, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin have also adopted modified first-generation statute5. Sea 
Romano, supra note 2, at 114 n.10. It should be noted, too, that Delaware still hru. on the books 
a relatively weak first-generation statute which has never been overturned. DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 
8, § 203 (1987). 
122. See Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 9, at 343. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
126. Exchange Act Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-10 (1987). 
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graphic areas, even if on balance they generate economic gains.127 The 
problem, however, is that such information is of very little interest to 
most target shareholders as shareholders. 128 It is highly unlikely that 
an investor will or even ought to base the decision to tender on social 
considerations. 129 Such information might, on the other hand, legiti-
mately affect the thinking of a target company's board of directors 
with respect to whether resistance is appropriate. Indeed, Penn-
sylvania has amended its corporation code to authorize boards in the 
discharge of their duties to consider "the effects of any action upon 
employees, upon suppliers and customers of the corporation and upon 
communities in which offices or other establishments of the corpora-
tion are located, and all other pertinent factors." 130 Nevertheless, 
even if state-level disclosure is an effective way of addressing the prob-
lem of social cost in the context of takeovers, and even if a state can 
constitutionally do anything to impede a takeover simply because it 
hurts its economy (which is highly doubtfu1131), state-level disclosure 
has nothing to do with coercion of target shareholders. Coercion is 
clearly a more pressing problem. Coercion allows bidders to buy com-
panies more cheaply than they otherwise could and enables them to 
foist on society the social costs that attend takeovers while keeping for 
themselves more of the gain.132 
2. Fair Price Statutes 
The most common sort of statute is based on the Maryland model, 
which focuses on cash-out mergers, the usual second step of a two-tier 
offer. 133 The Maryland statute requires, among other things, an 80% 
vote of all shareholders and a two-thirds vote of all remaining share-
holders other than the bidder to approve a cash-out merger.134 The 
bidder can avoid the vote by offering the highest price paid any other 
127. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 71-73, 104-09. 
128. Id., at 107-09. 
129. Cf Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (board directors 
may not divert, for humanitarian purposes, corporate assets owed to shareholders as dividends). 
130. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon Supp. 1987). Ohio has adopted a similar 
statute. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.1J 1701.59 (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987). See generally Oesterle, 
The Negotiation Model, supra note 36, at 138-42. 
131. See generally Langevoort, supra note 2. 
132. See text at notes 17-26 supra. 
133. Mo. CoRPS. & AssNs. CooE ANN. §§ 3-601, 8.301(14) (Supp. 1984). Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin have adopted 
similar statutes. See note 8, supra. 
134. Mo. CoRPS. & AssNs. CooE ANN. § 3-602 (1985). 
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shareholder to the remaining minority. 135 As has been noted, that 
often means that the price paid in the second step will actually be 
higher than the average price for shares purchased earlier. 136 
The Maryland statute has been popular in part because it is less 
restrictive: It applies only to the second step of a takeover - and thus 
was believed to have the best chance of surviving constitutional attack 
- and is the sort of statute preferred by some shareholders because it 
addresses the coercion problem.137 In any event, it tracks closely the 
kind of provision that corporations have most frequently adopted for 
themselves.138 As Professor Romano points out, that suggests that 
such a statute may reduce costs by eliminating.the need for individual 
companies to comply with the' formalities of amending their certifi-
cates.139 But as she argues, the fact that relatively few companies have 
actually adopted such provisions casts doubt on this explanation, un-
less the failure to adopt is explained by a fear of substantial opposition 
or negative trading reaction by shareholders.140 
The Maryland statute and others like it have merit because they 
eliminate two-tier offers by inducing bidders to do the second step at 
roughly the same price as the first. While all bids are arguably coer-
cive, some commentators maintain that when the bidder announces in 
advance that if a majority of target shares are tendered the remainder 
will be cashed out at the same price, there is no coercion: A target 
shareholder is free to hold out without risk of missing the premium if 
the offer succeeds.141 Such bids are thus positively desirable since they 
succeed only if the bidder in fact perceives that the target can be more 
efficiently operated under the new management. Moreover, the Mary-
land statute has the very real advantage of allowing the shareholders 
to approve a second-tier offer at a lower price if, because of changed 
circumstances, that becomes attractive. 
Still, the statute is inefficient to the extent that it actually requires a 
higher price to be paid in the second step.142 Moreover, since the 
supermajority vote effectively allows any significant minority to veto 
the second-step merger, there may be cases in which holdouts block a 
135. Mo. CoRPS. & AssNs. CooE ANN. § 3-603(b) (1985). 
136. See text at note 43 supra. 
137. Romano, supra note 2, at 117-20. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 120. 
140. Id. at 129-31. 
141. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 1, at 1361-62. But see Bebchuk, 
supra note 2, at 1740-42 (arguing that there is coercion even in such offers). 
142. See Booth, supra note 26. 
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merger which shareholders in the aggregate would have approved.143 
There may even be cases in which opportunistic shareholders veto the 
merger in hopes of receiving a bribe in a subsequent offer.144 The pri-
mary problem, however, is that there is nothing in the Maryland stat-
ute to prevent an abusive partial bid or to allow shareholders the 
option to decide when a partial bid should be entertained. Bidders 
remain free under such a regime to purchase a bare controlling interest 
and to leave the remaining shareholders to stew in their juice. As the 
SEC studies found, such offers are the least beneficial to target share-
holders and, it seems fair to conclude, are therefore the cheapest way 
for bidders to gain control of their targets.145 Thus, the Maryland 
statute may ultimately induce more undesirable partial offers although 
it will undoubtedly discourage some partial offers in which the bidder 
harbors an undisclosed plan sooner or later to merge the target with 
another company. 
3. Business Combination Statutes 
The New York statute (together with the newly adopted Delaware 
statute) also focuses on second-step mergers, but New York's statute 
goes well beyond the Maryland model by prohibiting business combi-
nations with an interested shareholder for a period of five years (which 
is nearly forever in the context of corporate takeovers) unless ap-
proved by target shareholders before the bidder acquires 20% of the 
target's shares.146 "Business combination" is very broadly defined and 
comprehends virtually every kind of organic change or asset disposi-
tion imaginable.147 Thus, the New York statute in essence prohibits 
"bust-up" takeovers, in which the plan is to sell off large parts of the 
target once control is gained.14s 
The New York statute is subject to the same criticism as the Mary-
land statute: it does not directly address partial offers. What is worse, 
143. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39. 
144. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (when it became apparent 
that tender offer would succeed target management struck deal with bidder allowing manage-
ment to tender its own shares); see also text at notes 42-62 supra. 
145. SEC, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Olfers, supra note 4; SEC, The 
Economics of Any-or-All, Partial and Two-Tier Tender Olfers, supra note 4. 
146. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 912 (McKinney 1986). Regarding the new Delaware statute, 
Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin have 
adopted similar statutes. See note 8 supra. 
147. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 912(a)(5) (McKinney 1986). 
148. See note 30 supra. The Delaware bill is a good deal less restrictive than its New York 
counterpart. It applies only to bidders who acquire between 15% and 85% of a target's shares. 
In such circumstances, a merger within three years must be approved by a two-thirds vote of 
disinterested shareholders. The Delaware statute is to be codified at Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, 
§ 203. For the complete text, see ~O Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 209 (Feb. 5, 1988). 
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however, the New York statute prohibits some bids which clearly are 
noncoercive and beneficial. Again, two-tier bids are a problem be-
cause the bidder announces in advance that, once control passes, re-
maining shareholders will be cashed out at a price lower than that 
offered in the front-end tender offer. The effect is to induce some 
shareholders to tender for less than they would otherwise be inclined 
to accept. But if the bidder announces in advance that if the tender 
offer succeeds in attracting a majority of target shares the remainder 
will be cashed out at the same price, there is no such coercion. 149 
The New York statute prohibits such two-step bids together with 
coercive two-tier bids. Moreover, the New York statute also prohibits 
innocuous clean-up mergers following a successful bid for all the 
shares of a target. In short, the New York statute simply prohibits 
hostile takeovers which are motivated by a bidder's plans to change 
significantly the business of the target, since the statute requires that a 
hostile acquiror maintain the acquired company largely in its pre-ex-
isting form. Yet the most important positive effect of hostile takeovers 
is that they are a means of redeploying assets, which are not being put 
to their highest and best use, by replacing inefficient managers or by 
threatening them into making changes. 150 On balance, then, the New 
York statute is a reprehensible protectionist law. 
New York also adopted a statute prohibiting greenmail unless ap-
proved by shareholder vote. 151 Unlike the five-year merger ban, this 
statute makes some sense, although it is clearly of limited impact since 
greenmail is only one of many defenses a target company can deploy. 
It may also prove to be counterproductive in that target shareholders, 
although sometimes served by greenmail, may be reluctant to vote for 
it. Management is in a far better position to know whether another 
more attractive bid is likely. But management will not often be in a 
position to disclose anything very convincing that will justify green-
mail. Either the expected better bid will be inchoate and greenmail 
will buy ~ome time, or the alternate bid will be sufficiently well defined 
that greenmail will be unnecessary. Thus it seems doubtful that green-
mail statutes represent much of an improvement. 
4. Appraisal Statutes 
Pennsylvania has adopted still another kind of statute, which gives 
remaining shareholders what amounts to an appraisal right after a bid-
149. See text at note 141 supra. 
150. See Coffee, supra note 11; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11; Gilson, supra note 42. 
But see Leebron, supra note 5 (outlining several other possible reasons for takeovers). 
151. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 513(e) (McKinney 1986). See generally Gilson, supra note 3. 
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der acquires a 30% stake in the target company.152 A holdout share-
holder may demand a cash payment for her shares equal to the 
judicially determined fair value on the day before the bidder reaches 
30% ownership.153 The Pennsylvania statute is in some ways prefera-
ble to the Maryland model since it addresses the plight of the minority 
shareholder after a partial bid. Nevertheless, the appraisal remedy -
for which Pennsylvania seems to have an inexplicable penchant154 is 
far from an ideal way to handle the problem. As with the Minnesota 
disclosure statute, the appraisal remedy requires outside intervention, 
in this connection to decide the true value of target stock in a situation 
in which the value is, by definition, indeterminate. The bidder and the 
target shareholders are, after all, engaged in what amounts to a negoti-
ation. The bidder thinks that the company is worth some price higher 
than the market indicated before the bid. The target shareholders re-
alize that the bidder expects to gain from the deal, but they do not 
know by how much. In the end, the gain will be split somehow be-
tween the shareholders who will receive a premium and the bidder 
who will own the company and its enhanced prospects. Any price 
between the pre-bid market price and the bidder's privately estimated 
value of the target could be said to be a fair price under such condi-
tions. To set up a judge or any other official as an arbiter of fairness is 
not only futile, it is downright misleading insofar as it suggests there is 
a determinable fair price for which the target may be sold.155 
In short, appraisal is a second-best method of valuation (at best) 
which can do no more than substitute an unknown rule of valuation 
for a reasonably well understood, even if not altogether fair, bidding 
process. While the mystique of litigation and judicial decision may 
have some marginal benefit in reassuring a populace nervous about the 
effects of takeovers, it also injects into the implicit negotiation between 
buyer and seller the unnecessary and therefore costly risk attending an 
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987). Maine and Utah are the only 
other states that have adopted similar statutes. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 910 (1987 
Supp.); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 16-10-76.S (1987). See note 8, supra. 
153. Romano, supra note 2, at 116-17 & n.19. 
154. See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958); see also Garrity, supra 
note 8, at 590 (noting that appraisal rights have been recognized "particularly" in Pennsylvania). 
It may be that Maine followed the Pennsylvania statute because it too placed particular faith in 
the appraisal remedy. See In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 
A.2d 54, 58 (Me. 1979). In the vein suggested by Professor Romano, a state's political tradition 
or institutional memory may strongly influence its choice of whether to enact a takeover statute 
and what sort of statute to enact. Cf Booth, Self-Regulation in a Democratic Society, SO J. AlR 
L. & CoM. 491, 500 (1985). 
155. Booth, supra note 26; Leebron, supra note S. For a striking example of how unsympa-
thetic a court may be to the plight of the holdout shareholder, see Armstrong v. Marathon Oil 
Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987). 
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individual judge's opinion. Specifically, the Pennsylvania statute is 
likely to generate all sorts of litigation as to the fair value of target 
stock. Bidders will no doubt argue that the market price on the day 
before control passes is too high because it reflects their buying activ-
ity, while target shareholders will argue that the stock is worth even 
more than the market indicates because tendering shareholders were 
coerced by the threat of being left behind (ironically) with nothing but 
an appraisal remedy. While recognizing the right of the remaining 
minority to be cashed out is perhaps a step in the right direction since 
it allows the problems of the minority to be litigated, creating such a 
right hardly provides a quick and clear answer and on balance proba-
bly costs more in the way of increased risk and unduly discouraged 
bids than it is worth in avoiding coercive bids. 
5. Control Share Statutes 
The Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter, 156 which is 
based on the more restrictive Ohio Control Share Acquisition Stat-
ute, 157 prohibits the acquiror of 20% or more of the shares of a cov-
ered company from voting those shares unless a majority of the other 
shareholders (other than management shareholders) votes to restore 
the acquiror's voting rights. 158 The Indiana Act requires a similar 
vote in the event of additional acquisitions raising the acquiror's inter-
est to over one third and one half, respectively, of the total voting 
power of the corporation.159 (It is unclear whether shares for which a 
vote has already been approved must again be reenfranchised upon 
crossing the next threshold.) The acquiror can demand that a vote be 
held within fifty days of filing an acquiring person statement with the 
corporation.160 If the acquiror does not prevail in the vote, the corpo-
ration may redeem the acquiror's shares at fair market value, but re-
demption is not required. 161 In the event a bidder prevails in the vote 
156. IND. CoDE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1987). 
157. See Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 9, at 345. The Ohio Act may be found at OHIO 
REv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985). The Ohio Act differs from the Indiana Act in 
several important ways. For example, the Ohio Act appears to require advance shareholder 
approval for the bidder even to purchase shares which lift its ownership over the one-fifth, one-
third, and one-half levels. Thus the Ohio law would seem to discourage bona fide investment 
transactions and might even catch in its net a brokerage firm which handled a disproportionate 
amount of the trading in an Ohio company. 
158. IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (West Supp. 1987). In addition to Indiana and Ohio, 
control share statutes have been adopted in Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Wiscon-
sin. See note 8 supra. 
159. IND. CoDE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1, -9 (West Supp. 1987). 
160. IND. CoDE ANN.§ 23-1-42-7 (West Supp. 1987). 
161. IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-42-lO(b) (West Supp. 1987). This provision could be read to 
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after acquiring a majority of shares, dissenting shareholders have the 
right to be cashed out at the highest price per share paid by the bidder 
in the control share acquisition.162 Finally, the Act applies only to 
companies incorporated in Indiana with headquarters or significant as-
sets there and 10% or 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana and 
which do not amend their charters to opt out of the Act's coverage.163 
The Indiana Act obviously· solves the coercion problem since it 
renders the bidder's shares sterile once a threshold is crossed. Thus, 
no matter how many shares the bidder amasses, the remaining share-
holders cannot be forced to sell in a cash-out merger unless they agree 
to allow the bidder to exercise his or her votes. And presumably the 
shareholders will not agree unless the bidder makes known in advance 
whether she intends to force a merger and, if so, at what price. It 
ought to be noted that the Indiana Act sterilizes the bidder's shares for 
all purposes and prevents the bidder, or indeed any 20% shareholder, 
from assuming working control of the company even by voting ac-
quired shares in a regular annual meeting. In this sense, the Indiana 
impose fairly broad restrictions on repurchases of stock from potential bidders, that is, green-
mail. What the statute does, at a minimum, is give the target corporation an option to repur-
chase at fair market value the shares of a bidder who has failed to prevail in a shareholder vote or 
has failed to file an acquiring person's statement. The question is, however, whether this provi-
sion can be read to provide an exclusive standard for share repurchases generally or from poten-
tial bidders. For example, suppose a bidder acquires 20% and succeeds in a shareholder vote. 
Can the target company repurchase those shares - assuming of course that the owner agrees -
for a price in excess of market value? Arguably, when a vote has already been held, a repurchase, 
if any, should be at the statutorily specified price which the corporation could have paid if the 
vote had simply turned out differently, though practically speaking, the value of shares with 
votes is vastly different from the value of shares without votes. 
If management repurchases the shares with its own money (rather than the corporation's as is 
typical in a greenmail case), management too will be precluded from voting the shares unless 
enfranchised by a shareholder vote. Ironically, this means that the remaining nonmanagement 
shareholders will find themselves with relatively more voting power and with shares that are 
more valuable from the point of view of potential subsequent bidders. This result seems some-
what unfair in that the defensive repurchase of shares is probably one of the least manipulative 
tactics management could employ. Management is, after all, putting its money where its mouth 
is - saying, in effect, "we really do believe the offer is inadequate" - and competing directly 
with the bidder for shareholders who wish to sell out. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive 
Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1377 (1986). 
Finally, the Act does not specify precisely when fair market value is to be measured. Thus, in 
the case of a failed bid, the target company may be able to wait until market prices have fallen (if 
they do) before exercising this "option." This provision may then operate as something of a 
penalty against bidders who fail and may in fact constitute a disincentive for making bids for 
companies subject to the Act. 
162. IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-42-11 (West Supp. 1987). 
163. IND. CooE ANN. § 23-l-42-4(a)(3) to -5. Prior to August 1, 1987, the Act applied only 
if the board of directors adopted a resolution to opt into its coverage. IND. CooE ANN.§ 23-l-
42-3(b). It should be noted also that the Act does not apply to corporations ·with fewer than one 
hundred shareholders, a curious provision in light of the fact that the smaller a corporation is the 
more susceptible it is to coercive tender offers. IND. CoDE ANN.§ 23-l-42-4(a)(l) (West Supp. 
1987). 
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Act is very much like a statutory poison pill. 164 
The timing of the shareholder vote under the Indiana Act received 
much of the Supreme Court's attention in the CTS decision. In hold-
ing the Indiana Act unconstitutional, the Seventh Circuit followed, in 
part, the reasoning of the plurality in MITE that the Illinois statute 
there held unconstitutional among other things, imposed an unreason-
able delay in the tender offer process, which was in conflict with the 
timetable prescribed by Congress in the Williams Act. 165 The 
Supreme Court in CTS, however, distinguished MITE on the grounds 
that the Illinois Act had allowed an indefinite delay for a state official 
to conduct hearings and make findings on the fairness of the offer 
(either on her own initiative or that of target management). The 
Court held that the Indiana Act, unlike the unconstitutional Illinois 
Act, does not interfere generally with the federally imposed scheme or 
specifically with the federal timetable. The Indiana Act leaves it to the 
shareholders voting collectively to decide whether an offer will go for-
ward (rather than conferring that power on a state official or manage-
ment and thus upsetting the delicate balance established by Congress) 
and the fifty-day delay under the Indiana Act falls within the sixty 
days allowed under federal law to complete a tender offer (though the 
court failed to mention that tender offers may be completed in as few 
as twenty days). 166 The Court also rejected the notion that the Indi-
ana Act will discourage bidders from commencing offers, noting that 
an offer may be conditioned on obtaining shareholder approval. 167 
Thus, the Court's opinion should not be read as validating every 
variety of second-generation statute. The Indiana Act as upheld re-
lates to the voting rights of bidders, and voting rights, as the Court 
noted, have historically been subject to wide variations governed by 
state law and charter provisions.168 Other statutes which impose sub-
stantive terms on second-step mergers or directly restrict the sale of 
shares to bidders may still be struck down as an undue restraint on 
164. See text at notes 86-93 supra. 
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 
(7th Cir. 1986), revd. in part, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). 
166. 107 S. Ct. at 1646-47. 
167. 107 S. Ct. at 1647. 
168. 107 S. Ct. at 1647-52. It seems ironic in retrospect that state takeover statutes were held 
to be unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce while privately adopted shark 
repellents were left unaffected. See Leebron, supra note 5. However, the same irony is evident in 
the Williams Act's provision of tender offer ground rules which can be avoided by the simple 
expedient of cancelling an outstanding offer and starting a new one as in Schreiber, supra note 95. 
See notes 94 & 99 supra. The explanation, of course, is that state takeover statutes constitute 
state action, while shark repellents do not. Still, if one thinks of corporation law as a standard 
form contract - provided by the state simply because it is cheaper than individual negotiating, 
then perhaps takeover statutes are only superficially state action. 
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commerce derogating from the shareholder's right to make up her 
own mind about whether to sell her shares.169 Although the Supreme 
Court gave short shrift to the burden on commerce argument, the 
Court did note that the Indiana Act provides a way - consistent with 
the scheme set up by the Williams Act - for shareholders collectively 
to decide whether to sell or hold. 170 In short, it looks as if the Court 
took pains to preserve shareholder choice. And one might even go so 
far as to say that the Court thereby endorsed the burden on commerce 
argument. 
V. THE MERITS OF CONTROL SHARE STATUTES 
The Indiana Act is far from perfect as it stands, if for no other 
reason, because the Indiana Code also includes provisions similar to 
the Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania statutes. In theory, how-
ever, the control share vote could stand alone. And when considered 
alone, it is a remarkably intelligent approach to the problem of fairness 
in tender offers. First, the shareholder vote eliminates overtly coercive 
offers as well as implicitly coercive offers which are merely inadequate. 
The seemingly large assumption, of course, is that shareholders will 
actually vote intelligently. Despite the traditional wisdom that share-
holders do not care about voting, however, there are very good reasons 
to trust the process. Second, the Act also discourages private pre-offer 
purchases and thus the possibility of bribes or side payments that re-
duce the premium available for other shareholders. Third, the Indiana 
Act does not preclude partial and two-tier offers which for idiosyn-
cratic reasons may be attractive to shareholders. Fourth, the Act also 
169. Indeed, cases decided since CTS are about evenly divided on the constitutionality of 
other state statutes. See Batus, Inc. v. McKay, No. CV-N-118-HDM (1988 Westlaw 41, 395) 
(D. Nev. Mar. 30, 1988) (striking down Nevada law that prohibited tender offers of more than 60 
days duration); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp 458 (D. Del. 1988) (upholding Delaware 
business combination law); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., No. 88-190-JRR 
(1988 Westlaw 46,468) (D. Del., May 9, 1988) (same over SEC objection in amicus brief); Hyde 
Park Partners L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988) (Massachusetts law penalizing 
bidder who fails to disclose control intent before acquiring 5% of target stock by banning take-
over attempt for one year enjoined as not likely to pass constitutional muster); RTE Corp. v. 
Mark IV Indus., Inc., No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis., May 4, 1988) (striking down Wisconsin three-
year 10% business combination statute as preempted by Williams Act); Veere, Inc. v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., C88-571A (1988 Westlaw 42, 739) (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 16, 1988) (upholding 
Ohio statute); TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987) 
(Oklahoma control share law applying to out-of-state corporations with substantial nexus to state 
unconstitutional). See also SEC Says New York Takeover Law Violates Commerce, Supremacy 
Clauses, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 379 (Mar. 11, 1988) (management authority to 
limit post·bid transactions distinguishes New York law from Indiana law which merely provided 
for shareholder approval of bid). The court declined to decide the constitutional question since 
the plaintiff had failed to show irreparable harm entitling it to an injunction. Salant Acquisition 
Corp. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 682 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
170. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46, 1651. 
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addresses the long-standing problem of private sales of control, since it 
applies to all sales of control shares including those of currently con-
trolling shareholders. Fifth, and perhaps most significant, the Indiana 
Act may with minor modifications provide a self-executing mechanism 
that tends to assure that companies which need defenses against coer-
cive offers can have them cheaply, discourages companies that do not 
need protections from adopting defenses, and gives the market a rela-
tively easy-to-read label indicating which is which. 
A. The Beauty of Shareholder Voting 
Generally speaking, shareholder voting makes good sense in a 
takeover situation.171 Whether a particular shareholder is inclined to 
sell out or hold out, putting the issue to a vote relieves any pressure to 
sell for fear of being relegated to the minority. The shareholder can 
vote according to whether she believes the offer being made -
whether it is simply to allow the acquiror to be a fully enfranchised 
shareholder with whatever risks attend the bidder's status as such or 
whether it is to cash out all remaining shareholders - is sufficiently 
attractive. If one votes with the losing side, little is lost, as it is if one 
declines to tender believing the offered price is too low. In short, the 
shareholder vote has the beauty of allowing shareholders to indicate 
their desire to sell or hold out without having to risk a significant loss 
that goes with tendering the wrong way. Moreover, the control share 
vote is self-executing: It requires the intervention of no outside agency 
and does not purport to set up any hard and fast rules about what is 
fair. 
One genuine worry, of course, is that shareholders simply do not 
care about their vote or will vote however management instructs. 
That once may have been true, but these days it is difficult to believe 
that a shareholder with any significant stake in a target company will 
fail to cast a serious vote on the question whether the company should 
be sold at whatever premium the bidder offers. Given that institu-
tional investors control a majority of disinterested shares in many if 
not most companies and, as previously noted, that arbitrageurs fre-
quently amass as much as a majority of the target stock in takeover 
situations, it seems likely that a relatively few individuals - who may 
even be in touch with each other and thus capable of concerted action 
171. See Booth, supra note 26; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39, at 415-18. 
Indeed Professor Bebchuk has proposed a scheme of tender offer regulation which is similar in 
effect to the Indiana statute but which involves simultaneous tendering and voting as to whether 
the offer should proceed. His rationale for collapsing the two steps is simply that it would be 
cheaper. See Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 2; Bebchuk, The Pressure to 
Tender. supra note 2. 
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- are in a position effectively to decide the outcome of the vote.172 
Even if they are not, the vote may provide a focal point for grassroots 
organizing that would not likely arise if shareholders are forced to 
choose between tendering, selling in the open market, or holding out 
for a higher bid. At the very least, management and bidder will pres-
ent their best cases to the shareholders without the coercion and stra-
tegic behavior that necessarily attends a tender offer. 
Recent reports indicate that institutions are taking an ever more 
active part in fundamental decisions, such as the deployment of ad-
vance takeover defenses. 173 While this may sound conspiratorial, it is, 
as the Supreme Court recognized in CTS, a benefit for shareholders to 
be able to coordinate their decisions whether to sell. It is precisely 
shareholders' inability to coordinate their response in a straightfor-
ward tender offer that gives the bidder its biggest advantage: Since 
target shareholders fear that if they hold out others will tender, all are 
inclined to tender.114 
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have pointed out that the very 
survival of shareholder voting argues that it is a valuable institution, 
and they surmise that its value lies in reducing agency costs by giving 
shareholders a potential veto over transactions which do not advance 
their interests as residual claimants on the wealth of the firm. 175 Con-
veniently, the explanation is consistent with the observation that there 
are very few shareholder votes of consequence. Nevertheless, it seems 
quite likely that management either consults with larger shareholders 
in advance or simply does not propose transactions that are not likely 
to be approved. Thus, there is little reason to expect many contested 
votes and little reason to worry that the institution of shareholder vot-
ing appears on the surface to be a rubber stamp. Moreover, whether 
shareholders care about voting or actually bother to exercise their vote 
is very much beside the point, for the vote will induce the bidder to 
offer a fair price in the first place. While there are obvious problems in 
proving their theory, Easterbrook and Fischel point to several phe-
nomena that support the ,view that voting has value even though 
shareholders tend to ignore it. 176 As they note, institutional investors 
have vigorously opposed many shark repellent charter amendments, 
such as provisions requiring a supermajority vote in connection with 
mergers. 
172. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985). 
173. See Romano, supra note 2, at 129-31; note 40, supra. 
174. See Bebchuk, supra note 2. 
175. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39, at 401-06. 
176. Id. at 406-08. 
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Easterbrook and Fischel do profess some mystification at why 
managers submit issues to a shareholder vote when they are not re-
quired to do so.177 They speculate that one reason may be that legal 
rules encourage managers to do so. That is, failure to seek ratification 
may mean a penalty in the form of damages or expensive litigation and 
delay. However, a more powerful reason would seem to be that if 
voting does in fact reduce agency costs in the cases in which it is re-
quired by law, it probably also reduces agency costs when manage-
ment chooses to use it voluntarily. 178 Indeed, shareholder ratification 
is one of the best recent examples of how corporate norms seem to 
follow what the parties would agree to do if able to negotiate: Dela-
ware, the jurisdiction arguably most in tune with what shareholders 
and management really want from each other, has in recent years 
given shareholder votes enhanced legal effect. Perhaps the most nota-
ble example is in conhection with freeze-out mergers, where the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has established a presumption of fairness if the 
deal is approved by a fully informed vote of the noninterested share-
holders, a procedure which is nowhere to be found in statutory law.179 
It is admittedly somewhat off the mark to talk of agency costs in 
connection with a freezeout or management buyout where manage-
ment and shareholders are better described as adversaries than as 
agent and principal. It is probably more precise to think of voting as a 
bonding mechanism by which management proves that there are no 
significant objections, and risks added liability to demonstrate that full 
disclosure has been made. For example, in a transaction such as a 
management buyout, the shareholder vote can reassure public share-
holders that they are receiving an appropriate premium in a transac-
tion that often cannot be put to a market test because of management's 
controlling interest. Moreover, shareholder voting can operate as a 
negotiating mechanism between shareholders and management. The 
fact that a vote is valuable to someone else is sufficient to make it 
valuable to the shareholder.180 Since a vote is clearly valuable to the 
bidder or management who can use it to control the company (even 
though the vote is no good to the shareholder for such purposes), the 
shareholder will insist on getting top dollar for it. Even though a 
shareholder may hold a fully diversified portfolio and may care very 
little about the ups and downs of particular companies represented in 
177. Id. at 417-18. 
178. Cf. Coffee, supra note 10, at 25-28 (discussing voluntary measures undertaken by man· 
agers to reduce agency costs). 
179. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
180. See Booth, supra note 26. 
June 1988] State Takeover Statutes 1685 
it, the shareholder will not ignore the opportunity to realize an addi-
tional gain where there is nothing to be lost by treating the decision to 
accept or reject an offer as outside the logic of diversification. That is, 
the shareholder will approach the voting decision very much as man-
agement would. 
In short, shareholder voting, though much maligned, is a more 
trustworthy institution than it is generally given credit for being. 
While there remains some concern that a shareholder who has no abil-
ity to affect the outcome of a vote will simply vote in favor of the first 
reasonable bid, there is reason to believe each vote will be actively 
courted (albeit in proportion to the size of the block) and that much, if 
not all, of the coercion (or temptation) to tender will be obviated. 
B. Elimination of Side Payments 
In a logical extension of their argument for the value of share-
holder voting, Easterbrook and Fischel defend the presumption that 
each share carries one vote. By the same token, they criticize cumula-
tive voting on the ground that any distribution of voting rights which 
differs from financial rights will create additional agency or negotiat-
ing costs since shareholders with greater voting rights will have hold-
up power and, in effect, will insist on some extra payment (or bribe) to 
vote consistently with the aggregate interests of the residual financial 
claimants. 181 They quite rightly point out that the overly broad distri-
bution of hold-up power, as under cumulative voting, may generate 
the perception among individual voters that their votes are worth 
more when aggregated than the total benefit to be gained from the 
transaction in question, making negotiation difficult if not 
impossible.182 
The argument proves more than Easterbrook and Fischel con-
clude. Obviously, institutional investors are among the largest and 
best organized shareholder groups. Often they themselves have hold-
up power and will thus regard their shares as worth more than those 
that do not possess such control. In other words, they will use the 
power they have, and even if they do not, management or a potential 
bidder will anticipate that they will. Yet, as Easterbrook and Fischel 
note, the potential for inconsistent and illogical decisionmaking in-
creases where there are, in effect, two masters being served.183 The 
181. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39, at 408-10. See also SEC, supra note 41, at 
87,182 (recognizing possibility that shareholders vote for shark repellent charter amendments 
because they expect to be paid for doing so). 
182. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39, at 408-10. 
183. Id. at 405-06. 
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clear implication is that the hold-up power of institutional investors 
should be neutralized to the extent possible. 
The Indiana Act does just that. Under the Indiana Act a bidder 
who acquires a 20% position cannot vote. There is thus little or no 
incentive to bribe early tenderers. The control share vote renders all 
votes equal. It eliminates the hold-up power that larger or well organ-
ized shareholder groups can exercise in connection with a transfer of 
control and thus their ability to negotiate for a bribe. In short, the Act 
obviates quasi-coercion. Since bidders will likely have access to any 
number of sources for early shares, the first 20% will ordinarily be 
available for a minimal premium, and whatever additional amount 
would have been paid for the privilege of voting the shares will be 
redistributed to (or at least available for) remaining shareholders. 184 
Arguably, the Indiana Act does leave some room for a larger 
shareholder to insist on a bribe in connection with the control share 
vote. What, after all, is to keep a larger shareholder from striking a 
private deal with a bidder to vote in favor of enfranchising the bidder 
in exchange for the bidder's later buying the shares at a larger pre-
mium than is offered to the remaining shareholders (assuming there is 
any offer made to the remainder at all)? 
There are several answers. In the first place, such a deal would 
likely be viewed as illegal vote selling.185 Second, even iflegal, the deal 
would need to be disclosed if ever reduced to an enforceable form. 186 
And disclosure would likely galvanize any opposition to the bid or, 
more likely, would lead to lawsuits. Third, and probably most impor-
tant, such a deal would likely render the subject shares nonvotable 
under the Act itself, which sterilizes interested shares, that is, shares as 
to which an acquiring person may "exercise or direct the exercise of 
the voting power of the issuing public corporation in the election of 
directors."187 
There is, of course, a danger of unspoken agreements and engi-
neered coincidences. Conceivably, regular players in the takeover 
184. See Leebron, supra note 5. 
185. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982); Chew v. Inverness Mgt. Corp., 
352 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1976); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39, at 410-11 (discuss-
ing reasons for prohibition against vote buying); Note, The Standstill Agreement: A Case of 
Illegal Vote Selling and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 93 YALE L.J. 1093 (1984). 
186. See Exchange Act Schedule 13D, Item 6 (Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or 
Relationships with Respect to Securities of the Issuer), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101-6 (1987). 
187. IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West Supp. 1987). One might quibble, of course, with 
the "election of directors" language. That is, it could be argued that a proxy given solely for 
purposes of a control share vote does not fall literally within this definition of interested shares. 
Section 23-l-42-2(a), however, makes it quite clear that acquiring the right to vote is itself a 
control share acquisition. 
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game might share their gains with block sellers as payment for future 
favors. One solution might be to set up a presumption that shares 
bought within, say, a year were bought as part of a deal. 188 The prob-
lem, of course, is that any such presumption naturally becomes a stan-
dard of minimum behavior, is relied on for its very precision, and 
because of the reliance it engenders is especially resistant to change. It 
is thus far from clear that the Indiana Act will succeed in eliminating 
all favored treatment of better organized shareholder groups. Some 
shareholders will likely always have hold-up power and the ability to 
command a higher premium in ways that are difficult to predict. For 
example, large yes-voters may be given the option to remain share-
holders in an attractive successor corporation. 
There are, however, good reasons for allowing some shareholders 
to capture larger benefits. Unless there is a particular shareholder or 
group that is a real threat, there may be no genuine incentive for man-
agement to please any of the shareholders.189 As matters currently 
stand, small shareholders get a free ride on the larger shareholders' 
monitoring of corporate management. Unless the larger shareholder 
can command (or capture) extra return in excess of a pro rata benefit 
for monitoring, there may be insufficient incentive to perform the ser-
vice. Indeed, it is unreasonable not to pay the monitoring shareholder 
something extra for valuable services rendered. Since the benefit in-
ures to the shareholders, it should come out of their pockets. Thus, it 
may be that some level of disproportionate treatment is beneficial for 
all concerned. 
In short, there is some danger that the Indiana Act may have done 
the job of equalizing shares too well. In the grand scheme of things, 
however, it seems likely that slightly lower incentives to monitor are a 
small price to pay for eliminating the distortions of takeover by brib-
ery. It is even more likely that larger shareholders will find ways to 
increase their own return to compensate for monitoring. The impor-
tant point, however, is that the Indiana Act appears to eliminate dis-
proportionate - indeed virtually unchecked - compensation for 
larger shareholder-monitors in the absence of such a statute. 
188. Compare IND. CooE ANN.§ 23-l-42-2(b) (West Supp. 1987) (shares acquired within 90 
days or pursuant to plan of control share acquisition are control shares). 
189. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 16-24; Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial 
and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982). Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate 
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) (unequal treatment of shareholders may some-
times be necessary to accomplishing mutually beneficial transaction), with Bebchuk, supra note 2, 
at 1780-88 (unequal treatment is unfair), and Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39, at 409-10 
(unequal voting power creates distortions in shareholders' valuation of their shares). See also 
Gilson, supra note 42. 
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C. Preservation of Attractive Partial Bids 
Perhaps the most appealing feature of the Indiana Act is that it 
does not necessarily preclude all two-tier or partial bids. The problem 
with such bids is that shareholders in the aggregate may end up worse 
off after a shift of control even though tenderers as a subgroup are 
better off. Losses to holdouts may exceed gains to sellers. But it is 
also possible for holdouts to enjoy some gain even though sellers enjoy 
more. Suppose, for example, that following a successful $150 per 
share bid for a bare majority of a target trading at $100, the remaining 
target shares trade for $120. Though the holdout may regret not 
tendering, and though there may be some unfairness in leaving the 
smaller gain with the shareholders who valued the company more 
highly, clearly even the holdout is better off. Suppose now that a cash-
out merger at $130 is proposed. Again, although the holdout may rue 
the day he or she failed to tender, he or she has every reason to vote 
for the merger. 
There is no good reason to prohibit such deals absolutely. While 
there may be a certain residual coercion felt by potential holdouts, 
takeover battles are conducted in the real world where things take 
time, circumstances change, and new information comes to light. A 
bidder who in good faith believes a target to be worth $150 per share 
may discover upon gaining control that in fact the company was really 
only worth $130 at the time of the bid, or that the market as a whole 
has fallen in the interim so that $130 is now an equivalent price.190 
It is, of course, possible for a bidder to obtain one fifth, one third, 
or a majority of the shares of the target, to be enfranchised by share-
holder vote on the representation that the shares will be held for in-
vestment only, and then, claiming some change of circumstances, to 
cash out the remaining shareholders at a loss. Similarly, the bidder 
might assume control of the target having convinced the shareholders 
that it has superior management skills or a more promising business 
strategy than old management and then proceed to run the company 
as a captive subsidiary, making it just profitable enough in its dealings 
with the parent to avoid the charge of looting. These are not serious 
concerns. Presumably the courts can deal with those few cases in 
which bidders misrepresent their intentions. Moreover, it seems un-
likely that shareholders will readily approve vesting control in a bidder 
who does not offer substantial assurances against taking such advan-
tages. For example, the bidder might offer the remaining shareholders 
an option to compel the bidder to repurchase minority shares at some 
190. See Berg, supra note 48. 
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fixed price at some point in the future, thereby reducing or perhaps 
even eliminating the risk that the price of minority shares will fall 
(even for external reasons such as a general decline in the stock 
market). 
In any event, partial and two-tier bids may sometimes be ap-
proved, as well they should, since the bidder may really offer superior 
management or plans. In short, there is no reason to require a bidder 
who faces considerable risk in the first place to assume still more risk 
by enshrining the initial bid as a floor for any future merger. That will 
only make it more expensive than necessary for bidders to do take-
overs. And potential target shareholders will in the end be the ones to 
suffer lower overall returns from inefficient management and too few 
attempted takeovers. 
Although one of the most desirable features of the Indiana Act is 
that it leaves open the possibility of a fair partial or two-tier offer, 
Indiana unfortunately also adopted a fair price statute.191 No doubt 
the Indiana General Assembly reckoned that a belt and suspenders 
approach was safest, but in this instance the fair price statute serves 
only to obviate the desirable flexibility of the control share statute, 
which allows shareholders to accept a bid they find attractive even if it 
is lower than the front-end bid. Little if any shareholder protection is 
gained, since the control share statute offers as much assurance against 
coercion in the event of a two-tier bid as the fair price statute. Still 
more unfortunate is that Indiana also opted for a New York style :five-
year merger ban, which eliminates the possibility of an equal price 
merger unless the merger is planned and approved before the bidder 
ever gains a 10% stake in the target. 192 Both provisions should be 
repealed as soon as possible.193 
191. IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-43-19 (West Supp. 1987). 
192. IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-43-19 (West Supp. 1987). 
193. The Indiana Act also confers dissenters' rights on remaining shareholders after the ap-
proval of a control share acquisition of a majority or more of the shares, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-
44-8( 4) (West Supp. 1987). This seems curious in that giving holdout shareholders the right to 
vote on whether a purchaser can vote would seem to be ample protection. Moreover, it seems 
quite unfair, at least at first blush, to expose a bidder to the risk - over and above the risk of 
losing the vote - that any substantial number of shareholders will seek to be cashed out. On the 
other hand, shareholders have traditionally had the right to dissent when they have the right to 
vote. And more important, acquisition of a majority of outstanding shares with the right to vote 
means that the company has effectively been sold to new management, just as if by merger. 
The impact of dissenters' rights in the context of a control share acquisition will probably be 
slight notwithstanding the fact that fairness of price is defined as the highest price paid to acquire 
control shares. In the first place, only shareholders who vote against enfranchising the bidder are 
eligible to dissent, and their numbers are by definition limited when the bidder has been ap-
proved, particularly if, as under the current statute the previously controlling shareholders are 
not able to vote. Second, many shareholders who vote against a bidder who nevertheless prevails 
will likely decline to pursue their dissenters' rights since they will recognize that most other 
shareholders perceived the shift in control as attractive. And even if a potential dissenter is not 
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D. Regulation of Inside Sales of Control 
The Indiana Act appears to apply not only to takeover bids 
launched by outsiders but also to sales of control by existing control-
ling shareholders. For example, the Act apparently would have gov-
erned the sale of control in Perlman v. Feldman 194 (which, indeed, 
involved an Indiana corporation). This was presumably no mere over-
sight on the part of the Indiana General Assembly, since a sale of 
control by a controlling shareholder is essentially equivalent to a par-
tial bid by an outsider. That is, the purchaser in such a case may be 
motivated to pay a premium to the seller, either because the purchaser 
intends to loot the company and is bribing the seller for the privilege, 
or because the purchaser thinks she can make the company worth 
more and can buy control at the lowest cost by dealing with the cur-
rent controlling shareholder. In either event, the Indiana Act appears 
now to give the nonselling shareholders the right to vote on whether 
the sale may go through. 
In this regard, the Act is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it 
seems only fair to apply sale of control standards uniformly to all buy-
ers including friendly ones. On the other hand, it is not clear that 
shareholders can easily be convinced of the good intentions of a poten-
tial buyer (any more than the wisdom of greenmail195). Presumably, 
friendly buyers will need to offer the same assurances as will hostile 
buyers. That means, of course, that friendly sales will become some-
what more expensive and thus less frequent. This feature of the Act 
may thus backfire in the same way as the New York greenmail 
statute.196 
Whether shareholder review of inside sales of control is good or 
bad depends on whether such sales are more often motivated by the 
opportunity to loot or by the buyers' better ideas. If the former, the 
Indiana Act is a marginal improvement. Unfortunately, it will not 
likely ever be known whether this is a positive aspect of the act, since 
its effects as measured by, say, the stock prices of Indiana companies 
persuaded by the consensus, the market price of target stock will presumably remain enhanced 
following a successful vote, meaning that the potential dissenter will virtually always choose to 
sell his or her shares in the open market rather than await the outcome of a lengthy and unpre· 
dictable appraisal proceeding. On the other hand, the Indiana Act defines fair value as a price 
not less than the highest price per share paid in the control share acquisition. Thus, although 
appraisal cannot ordinarily result in an award which reflects any gain from the offending transac-
tion, the Indiana Act does create some potential incentives to dissent. 
194. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). 
195. See text at note 151 supra. 
196. See Levmore, Book Review, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 1061 (1987) (reviewing D. BAYNE, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF CoRPORATE CONTROL: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY); 
Hamilton, supra note 22. 
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will no doubt be overshadowed by other effects of the Act, except per-
haps in the rare case of a publicly held company which is majority 
owned by a single individual or group and which does not opt out. 
Only in such a case will it be possible to isolate the effect of the Indi-
ana Act on the threat of an insider's sale of control as perceived by 
minority shareholders.191 
E. Identifying Targets Susceptible to Coercion 
Although the Indiana Act leaves open the possibility that holdout 
shareholders may approve partial and two-tier bids even when they 
are paid less than those who tender or sell in the first step, the Act 
(like a poison pill) also creates the danger of forcing bidders to offer 
higher premiums than they otherwise would, thus reducing the 
number of takeovers proposed, and in turn reducing management effi-
ciency. Such a result seems somewhat more likely than the converse 
approval of a lower second tier: In the absence of a control share stat-
ute, a bidder need only offer enough to satisfy half plus one of the 
target shareholders, whereas with a simple control share statute pro-
viding for a single vote when the bidder acquires, say, a majority of 
target shares, the bidder must also satisfy a majority of the remaining 
half minus one of the shareholders (or a total of three quarters of the 
shareholders as measured before the bidder began purchasing) in order 
to be enfranchised. The bidder can, of course, risk buying a bare ma-
jority and trying to convince the holdouts of the wisdom of conferring 
voting rights. But the risk of losing the vote may outweigh the cost of 
offering enough in the first place to satisfy the three quarters whose 
consent must eventually be had. 
It is possible that, because of this disincentive to bid for companies 
covered by the control share statute, the price that must be offered to 
early tenderers will be depressed enough to allow a higher back-end 
merger price. What seems more likely, however, is that the remaining 
shareholders will insist on a higher payment in exchange for their ap-
proval. The bidder may, of course, be able to avoid much of the risk 
by conditioning a bid on receiving shareholder approval. Still, the re-
quirement of a vote upon acquisition of a majority of shares has the 
same adverse potential as was observed in connection with the Mary-
land fair price statute.198 It seems to encourage holdout shareholders 
to insist on at least equal or perhaps better treatment than early sellers, 
197. See generally Weiss & White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' 
Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 551 (1987). 
198. See text at notes 142-44 supra. 
1692 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1635 
even though, but for the bargaining power conferred by the statute 
itself, shareholders would sometimes approve partial or two-tier bids. 
The operation of the Indiana Act is more complex than the single 
vote, 50% trigger control share statute described. The Indiana Act 
requires a bidder to estimate at three different ownership levels how 
many shareholders must be won over. The principle, however, is the 
same. By sterilizing the bidder's shares, the holdouts' shares are made 
more valuable than they otherwise would be and tender offers are 
probably unduly discouraged. For example, assume the bidder buys 
20% of the target. Ignoring the possibility of any management shares 
being sterilized - and in some cases there may be relatively few - the 
vote required to reenfranchise the bidder is 40% plus one. That means 
that any proposed cashout must satisfy just over 60% of the share-
holders as measured before the bidder began purchasing (that is, the 
20% who sold out plus the 40% who voted in favor of the bidder). 
The bidder is thus forced to pay more for the target than the share-
holders would have demanded in a perfectly uncoerced negotiation. 
Similarly, if the bidder purchases one third of the shares, the statute 
effectively requires two-thirds approval. And if the bidder purchases 
50% of the shares, the holders of 75% of all target shares must be 
satisfied that the shift in control is wise. 
It ·seems likely, at least in the situation described, where manage-
ment itself controls few shares, that the Indiana Act increases the 
price a bidder must pay to effect a takeover. And ultimately, that is 
the reason most courts and commentators have been highly critical of 
state takeover legislation.199 (It bears noting, however, that the same 
criticism has been leveled at the Williams Act,200 though it can also be 
argued that on balance the Williams Act lowers the price of take-
over. 201) Nevertheless, the fact that the Indiana Act makes it more 
expensive (or apparently so) for a hostile bidder to gain control does 
not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the Act is bad for business. 
Inasmuch as the Indiana Act is similar to a statutory poison pill, it 
may well be appropriate for a company which is susceptible to a coer-
cive bid. If there is a peculiar danger that a potential target company 
may be subject to a bid in which no competition will arise, or in which 
holdout shareholders will lose more as a result of looting (or quasi-
199. See text at notes 107-09 supra; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 101. 
200. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 101. But see Leebron, supra note 5, at 181·82 (noting that 
expectation of bargaining parties affects willingness to accept particular price and suggesting that 
increases in tender offer premiums over time may thus be natural). 
201. See R. Booth, supra note 5 (Williams Act rules - especially the highest price rule -
eliminate much of the reason for a shareholder to hold out); Leebron, supra note 5, at 174-77 
(bidders gain more in tender offers than in negotiated mergers). 
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looting) than tenderers will gain, then the effective 75% control re-
quirement of the Indiana Act may make sense. 
The fact that the Act applies to all covered Indiana companies, 
however, raises the central question whether on balance the Act will 
prevent truly coercive bids and attendant losses, or rather will protect 
larger companies for which a partial or two-tier bid does not visit 
losses on holdouts and is not coercive. Again, it seems likely that big-
ger targets are less susceptible to coercion. Bigger companies are more 
actively traded and more efficiently priced. They are less likely to in-
crease or decrease dramatically in value for any reason, be it a techno-
logical breakthrough or operation as a captive subsidiary. At the very 
least, there is reason to believe that the problem of coercion is not the 
same for every potential target company, and for some· very large com-
panies coercion may be no problem at all. For such companies, the 
Indiana Act serves only to entrench incumbent management, even 
though for smaller companies the Act may perform a valuable 
function. 202 
1. Opting Out 
Since the Indiana Act allows covered companies to opt out203 if 
their shareholders prefer exposure to coercive bids, it is arguable that 
the stocks of companies which inappropriately choose protection 
might be disfavored in the market. That is, it may be argued that in 
the end, the forces of the marketplace will induce companies to do the 
right thing. And if it turns out that protection against partial and two-
tier bids makes sense for some companies but not for others, then the 
Indiana Act has the considerable advantage of catering to both. There 
is reason to worry, however, that the market is not that efficient. 
Poison pills, which are similar to a privately adopted control share 
statute, are devised and adopted one company at a time. The market 
can be expected to discipline strictly any company which adopts a pill 
that is overprotective (and perhaps any company that adopts a pill at 
all). Because the Indiana Act applies to all Indiana corporations 
which do not opt out, however, it is much less risky for any one com-
pany, in effect, to try out a poison pill. 
The same would be true, though probably less markedly, if the 
Indiana Act were of the opt-in variety. The reason, ironically, is the 
same one that makes partial and two-tier offers coercive. The com-
pany that dares to adopt a poison pill not knowing whether others will 
202. See text at notes 63-76 supra. 
203. IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-42-5 (West Supp. 1987). 
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follow may indeed find that others do not follow. If so, the lonely 
leader may become the focus of adverse shareholder reaction and may 
suffer devastating discounting in the market, making it an even more 
likely target. However, if every company adopts measures that share-
holders dislike, there may be no significant market reaction, unless 
there is a reasonably close substitute investment to which investors 
may turn at relatively little cost. And even if the statute is of the opt-
in variety, it may provide enough coordination for many companies to 
risk adopting it, possibly on the argument that others are likely to opt 
in, so that most all will opt in. 
It may appear, then, that takeover statutes are abusive because 
they are a way for target companies to circumvent a vote of their own 
shareholders and perhaps even market discipline (at least in the sense 
of not being singled out for discounting).204 On the other hand, as 
previously noted, there may be occasions when larger or better coordi-
nated shareholders will be able to veto shark repellent amendments 
and will be motivated to do so because they expect to be paid a dispro-
portionate amount (a bribe) for their shares if a tender offer arises. If 
so, such companies, or more precisely their noninstitutional share-
holders, may benefit from a control share statute precisely because it 
can be adopted without a shareholder vote. 
Professor Romano has suggested that the central problem may be 
how to tell which companies have the sort of shareholder population 
for which a takeover statute makes sense ~d what kind of company is 
predominant in each jurisdiction.205 Presumably, a state in which 
most of the publicly traded companies are susceptible to a coercive 
takeover ought to adopt an opt-out statute (and vice versa), thereby 
achieving a maximum reduction in the transaction costs of negotiating 
corporate charters.206 Professor Romano found no convincing evi-
dence of a correlation between the kind of shareholder population 
within a state's corporations and the state's adoption of a takeover 
statute (or the speed with which the statute is adopted). Neither did 
she find any evidence that the market value of companies incorporated 
in states which adopt takeover statutes either rises or falls (though this 
204. It has been argued by some that managers are (quite naturally and to some extent 
rightly) more concerned about protecting their jobs and deferred compensation arrangements 
than they are about keeping the price of the company's stock high. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 
10, at 16-24. If so, market discipline other than the threat of takeover may make little difference 
to such managers and a takeover statute would likely be viewed as a particularly attractive de-
vice. See also Gilson, supra note 42. 
205. See Romano, supra note 2, at 180-87. 
206. Id. See also R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 369-72 (3d ed. 1986) (function 
of corporation code is to provide standard form contract between shareholders and 
management). 
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inquiry was complicated by the difficulty of determining exactly when 
the market will react).201 
The worry that companies which ought not adopt takeover de-
fenses will be able to take advantage of the statute is probably over-
stated however. First, even though investors who could block a 
decision to opt in will not necessarily be able to force the company to 
opt out,2°8 management will have an incentive to opt out if it is appro-
priate, since by doing so it will stand out from the crowd in a positive 
way in the eyes of investors and will likely be rewarded with cheaper 
capital. Opting out will not only expose the company to the threat of 
takeover and the discipline that goes with it, it will also signal to inves-
tors management's high level of confidence in the job it is doing. Sec-
ond, and more important (though somewhat at odds with the first 
point), it is unclear that a control share statute is much of a deterrent 
against the takeover of a larger company with more diverse sharehold-
ers. Presumably, the smaller company can be controlled by acquiring 
large blocks of shares from a relatively few shareholders and is there-
fore most susceptible to a coercive offer or one which directs a bigger 
premium to key shareholders. Moreover, larger companies can in 
many cases be controlled with a smaller percentage of shares than are 
required to trigger the control share statute. Shareholders in a large 
target company are less likely to have opinions of the target's value 
which differ as much as they do in a smaller company which is more 
susceptible to dramatic changes of fortune and whose stock is less 
heavily traded. Finally, larger companies are much less susceptible to 
advantage-taking or quasi-looting by a prospective parent, which can 
drive down the price of shares after control has passed. In short, it is 
probably not that damaging to shareholder wealth for a company 
which should not be subject to a control share provision to be covered 
while the converse is potentially quite destructive. 
Thus again, it may be difficult to tell whether the Indiana Act is 
something that on balance is good for the capital markets, particularly 
if most states adopt such provisions. For the moment, however, there 
207. Romano, supra note 2, at 181-86. See also SEC (Office of the Chief Economist), Institu-
tional Ownership, Tender Offers, and Long-Term Investments (Apr. 19, 1985) (finding no statisti-
cal evidence that takeover activity or institutional ownership leads managers to focus on short 
term results). But see Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of 
Shareholder Choice, 75 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1987) (reporting relatively small institu-
tional ownership in companies proposing dual class recapitalization). There is every indication, 
however, that managers pay attention to the compostion of the shareholder population particu-
larly in connection with the threat of takeover. See FERRARA, supra note 2, at 189-91; SHARE-
HOLDER ACTIVISM, supra note 40; The Trench Warriors, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1988, § 3 
(Business), at 1, col. 2. 
208. See Romano, supra note 2, at 186-87. 
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remains a reasonably wide variety of second-generation takeover stat-
utes from which to choose and presumably companies which choose to 
be incorporated in the states which offer the optimal kind of statute 
will be rewarded with cheaper capitai.209 
2. Sterilization and the Fair Vote 
There is further reason to believe that the Indiana Act is less pro-
tective of management in certain circumstances than may at flrst ap-
pear. Consider again the situation in which a bidder has acquired a 
20% stake in the target company. If management - which cannot 
vote its shares on a control share question under the Indiana Act -
also controls 20% of the company's shares, the bidder need only woo a 
majority of the 60% which neither it nor management owns. That 
30% plus one in addition to the 20% which the bidder has already 
bought adds up to a bare majority of the shares as measured before the 
bidder began buying. In such a case, the Indiana Act produces an 
eminently fair result - but only accidentally, that is, only because 
bidder and management happen to own the same number of shares. 
Needless to say, in larger companies, in which management controls 
relatively little stock, sterilization works a real disadvantage on the 
bidder. Not only is the bidder precluded from voting, but the bidder 
has already bought the shares most likely to be voted in favor of the 
bidder's enfranchisement. Of course, management too is precluded 
from voting its shares, which are presumably the ones most likely to 
vote against the bidder. Yet, where management owns fewer shares 
than the bidder, the bidder is put at a distinct disadvantage, because 
more of the votes likely to be cast in its favor have been sterilized. It 
seems backwards, to say the least, to make it more difficult for a bidder 
to proceed the more shares it acquires. On the other hand, in a corpo-
ration large enough to have a management with relatively few votes of 
its own, it seems likely that a bidder who acquires just under 20% of 
209. In other words, it would seem preferable to eschew at least for the moment any tempta· 
tion to preempt state takeover laws by imposing a uniform federal scheme, as has been proposed 
in a number of bills in Congress. See notes 94-96, supra; House Staff Is Drafting Compromise on 
Preempting State Control Share Laws, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1443 (Sept. 25, 
1987); Senate Panel Approves Takeover Bill, Is Neutral on State Antitakeover Laws, 19 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1479 (Oct. 2, 1987); Leebron, supra note 5 (fixed rules create 
inefficiencies; state law has traditionally been more flexible; Williams Act was passed against 
backdrop of state law); Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate 
Law, 65 TExAs L. REV. 469 (1987); see also Romano, supra note 2, at 181 (reaction of stock 
market is best evidence of value of takeover statute). But see Weiss & White, supra note 197. It 
bears noting that Delaware declined - somewhat to the surprise of observers - to adopt a 
statute similar to the Indiana Act. See Delaware Bar Committee Decides to Study Control Share 
Law Further, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 868 (June 12, 1987); 19 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 922 (June 19, 1987) (reporting explanatory letter from bar committee to 
Delaware Secretary of State). 
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the stock will be able to exert a good deal of influence and perhaps 
even actual control over the company. Thus, as previously noted, the 
Indiana statute may not in practice prevent shifts in control at very 
large companies, but rather will have its greatest impact on smaller 
companies, which are by definition less efficiently priced and more sus-
ceptible to coercive bids. 
Nevertheless, where management and bidder have roughly equal 
stakes in the company, the vote is an elegant solution to the problem 
of coercion. This suggests a possible improvement in the Indiana stat-
ute. Rather than requiring a vote upon the acquisition of arbitrary 
percentages, as under the current statute, it might be more sensible to 
hold a single vote when the bidder acquires the same percentage of the 
target's stock as is controlled by pre-bid management, thus insuring 
what happened by accident in the example given. With the trigger 
percentage so determined, a vote of the disinterested shareholders 
would reflect the true median view of nonmanagement shareholders 
regarding the desirability of a continued battle for control. 
It is open to question, of course, whether the median view of disin-
terested shareholders as to the value of the company is in fact the opti-
mum standard by which to determine whether a takeover should 
proceed.210 Intuitively, a majority vote would seem to have merit, 
since where the bid price is approved by the median voter, at worst 
half the target shareholders will be overcompensated and half will be 
undercompensated. Moreover, assuming that a graph of the values 
perceived by the shareholders is a relatively straight and continuous 
line, the amount of overcompensation roughly equals the amount of 
undercompensation suffered by various shareholders. Well-diversified 
shareholders would be perfectly happy with such an outcome since 
they would sometimes receive more and other times less but on the 
average would get a fair price for their stock.211 
A simple majority vote will not, however, reflect whether those 
who vote in favor of the merger perceive the gain to be greater than 
the loss perceived by those who vote against the merger. It is possible, 
after all, that the range of values perceived by the shareholder popula-
tion (or by discrete groups) is not a smoothly sloping line but rather 
increases (or decreases) in jumps from one shareholder or group to the 
next. If for example, a minimal majority of the shareholders is barely 
satisfied by the offered price, while the remaining shareholders per-
ceive the value of the company to be considerably higher, the lost gain 
210. See Romano, supra note 2, at 189 n.142. 
211. See Booth, supra note 26. 
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for the holdouts could far exceed the realized gain to those voting in 
favor of the bid. 
At first blush, this problem would seem to be serious if institu-
tional investors are more often than not inclined to accept bids as is 
often said. On the other hand, it may be that the reason for their 
opposition to takeover defenses, as has been argued, is that institu-
tional investors often enjoy the opportunity to sell earlier or at an ef-
fectively higher price than other target shareholders. If that is the 
primary reason why institutional investors are willing to settle for 
smaller premiums, then it is no reason to question the efficacy of a 
majority vote under a control share statute. Since the vote will deter-
mine whether there will be any further sales to the bidder, institutional 
investors will ordinarily be denied any preference over other target 
shareholders and will have no peculiar incentive to vote in favor of the 
bid. There may be other as yet unidentified reasons why institutional 
investors or other groups of investors are more or less inclined to 
tender. At this juncture, however, there is no particular reason to 
think that a majority vote is not the optimum standard.212 
Admittedly, it may be difficult, for purposes of enforcing a one-
vote control share statute, to determine which shares should be re-
garded as under management control. (Similarly, and as noted previ-
ously, problems may arise in determining precisely which shares are 
controlled by the bidder.) The easy answer is that the same problem 
attends the Indiana Act as it currently stands (not to mention federal 
law). Under the current statute, management has every incentive to 
minimize the number of shares that are deemed to be under its con-
trol. And it seems fair to assume that there will be a good deal of 
litigation over whether shareholders friendly to target management are 
in fact controlled by management. 
A modified statute requiring a single vote upon a bidder's acquisi-
tion of the same percentage as management would discourage such 
controversies. Under such a statute, management would be faced with 
conflicting incentives. On the one hand, management would still be 
tempted to understate its control in order to count the votes of friendly 
shareholders. On the other hand, management would also be tempted 
to overstate its control in order to postpone the vote, clear the market 
of shares most likely to vote in favor of the bid, and shift additional 
risks onto the bidder, who is forced to acquire a larger percentage of 
target stock without the benefit of knowing whether the bid can pro-
212. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39, at 409-10; Bebchuk, supra note 2; Leebron, 
supra note 5; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 2. 
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ceed. It seems likely then that on balance target managers would be 
inclined to state their control percentage accurately in order to avoid 
the possibility of a vote that is either too early or too late. It might 
even be advisable to require each covered company to state publicly in 
advance exactly what it considers its control percentage to be and to 
update the number as circumstances change.213 
Holding a single vote upon the bidder's acquisition of the control 
percentage differs from the law as it now stands. The current statute 
contemplates as many as three separate votes as the bidder crosses 
each statutory threshold. (Again, it is unclear whether the bidder 
must be reenfranchised as to all of her shares at each vote or simply as 
to newly acquired shares.) While this scheme is understandable be-
cause, among other reasons, control may often be exercised with less 
than a majority of the stock, it nevertheless seems wasteful in the ex-
treme to allow target shareholders three chances to decide and man-
agement as many as three chances to thwart a single takeover. No 
doubt the reason for requiring three votes was that different companies 
can be controlled with different percentages of shares. If, however, 
there is a reliable and relatively inexpensive way of determining, com-
pany by company, the percentage necessary for control, the sensible 
approach would be to hold a single vote at the time the bidder reaches 
that percentage of stock ownership. And what better evidence could 
there be of the percentage needed to control a company than the per-
centage management itself controls? 
It seems unlikely, in any event, that a second or third vote would 
ever tum out differently from the first. More important, however, the 
idea is to achieve an efficiently functioning takeover mechanism which 
takes shareholder preferences into account in an optimal way. The 
idea is not to assure that no shareholder will be dissatisfied with the 
outcome of any particular control contest, but rather that on the aver-
age shareholders - as well as bidders and target managers - are 
fairly treated. It is no argument in favor of multiple votes to say that 
shareholders have an inalienable interest in holding onto their shares 
and that only after repeated expressions of approval by the ever 
smaller majority of remaining disinterested shareholders can a bidder 
have full access to ownership rights.214 
213. For example, the SEC might require such disclosure annually in ·10K reports and re-
quire any changes to be reported in an SK. See Exchange Act Rules 13a-l, 13a-11, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13a-l, 13a-11 (1987). This might be particularly helpful in light of the fact that relatively 
few companies meet all the criteria for coverage under many second-generation statutes. See text 
at notes 108-20 supra. 
214. Compare Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (recognizing shareholder 
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VI. THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE PREEMPTION 
Although the Supreme Court in CTS gave little credence to the 
till-then widely accepted notion that most second-generation statutes 
were an undue burden on the free flow of securities and thus unconsti-
tutional under the dormant commerce clause, the Court might view 
other sorts of statutes less charitably;215 or regulatory developments 
might raise new questions about the Indiana Act and similar statutes. 
Though Congress has for now declined to pass legislation designed to 
preempt state takeover laws,216 there remains a serious threat that 
SEC or stock exchange rules touching on shareholder voting rights 
may be modified in such a way as to conflict with the operation of 
control share statutes (or worse). 
The SEC has recently announced that it proposes to curtail the use 
of devices which confer superior voting rights on some sharehold-
ers. 217 The proposed rule grew out of controversy surrounding the 
New York Stock Exchange's proposal to dilute its long-standing pol-
icy requiring equal voting rights for all shareholders.218 A growing 
number of NYSE-traded companies, fearful of exposing themselves to 
takeovers, undertook to recapitalize by exchanging financially attrac-
tive nonvoting stock for voting stock and began using nonvoting stock 
to acquire other companies.219 The NYSE, worried about losing busi-
ness to other exchanges more hospitable to takeover defenses, sus-
pended its rule rather than delist the offenders and sought either to 
abolish the rule or to induce (or force, with the help of the SEC's 
authority) the other exchanges to adopt similar rules.220 The SEC has 
now proposed to settle the controversy itself by adopting a rule to gov-
ern all exchanges. The conten;iplated rule will likely allow listed com-
panies to issue new stock with lesser voting rights in connection with 
acquisitions but will curtail recapitalizations in which existing voting 
interest in the form of investment), with Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) 
(overruling Singer). 
215. See note 169 supra. 
216. See notes 95-96 supra. 
217. See Voting Rights Listing Standards - Proposed Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange 
Act Release No. 24,623 [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 84,183 (June 24, 
1987). 
218. See Gilson, supra note 42; Gordon, supra note 207; Seligman, Equal Protection in Share-
holder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
687 (1986); Note, Dual Class Recapitalization and Shareholder Voting Rights, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 106 (1987). 
219. See Karmel, Is One Share, One Vote Archaic?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 1. It 
should be noted that dual class recapitalizations are often carried out using what amounts to a 
coercive exchange offer that shareholders cannot well refuse. See Gilson, supra note 42; see also 
Grundfest, supra note 3. 
220. See Karmel, supra note 219. 
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rights are significantly diluted presumably even contingently as they 
are when a poison pill is deployed.221 
Aside from the fact that the SEC's action infringes an area of regu-
lation traditionally left to the exchanges,222 the new rule would also 
seem to call into question the validity of statutes such as the Indiana 
Act which temporarily nullify the voting rights of bidders. It could be 
argued, after all, that SEC-imposed rules which limit the ability of 
target companies to dilute or eliminate voting rights are preemptive of 
state statutes which effectively suspend voting rights in many of the 
same situations.223 
The SEC's proposed action is clearly a victory for the NYSE, 
which feared losing listings because of its stricter rule. But it is far 
from clear that the rule, if adopted, will have much effect on the threat 
of takeover faced by the typical NYSE company. Again, two-tier of-
fers are far more of a threat to smaller companies which are less ac-
tively traded and which, because of their smaller size, are more 
susceptible to dramatic price swings or more likely to become captive 
subsidiaries. Shareholders in such companies are not only likely to 
differ more in their opinions of what constitutes an adequate offer, but 
they also justifiably fear the consequences of a partial bid and are thus 
more likely to tender early for what they perceive to be a less attractive 
offer than are shareholders in a large NYSE-listed company. Other 
things equal, the proposed rule is likely to disserve smaller companies 
and to eradicate whatever positive attraction alternative exchanges 
may have had. 224 If, in the end, the effect of the new rule is simply to 
force companies to use the available state statute rather than custom-
ized poison pills, it is probably all for the good. 225 On the other hand, 
if the SEC's rule is interpreted as preempting state takeover statutes, it 
will probably do more harm than good, since it will force all compa-
nies regardless of size, shareholder characteristics, control percentage, 
or likely consequences of takeover into a mold which is essentially 
designed for NYSE-listed companies. 
221. See Voting Rights Listing Standards, supra note 217; see also note 96 supra. 
222. See note 53 supra. 
223. See SENATE TENDER OFFER REPORT, supra note 8, at 53-54; see also SEC Concept 
Release, supra note 61 (raising possibility of rule requiring shareholder approval of poison pills). 
224. As I argue elsewhere, exchanges perform a unique standardizing function similar to that 
of state law. See R. Booth, supra note 5. In effect, the exchange on which a stock is traded can 
operate as a cheaply readable label describing, among other things, the sort of takeover defenses 
the company may employ. Moreover, the exchange can act as a coordinating agent to reduce the 
risk a company might face by adopting nonstandard rules. But to the extent the rules of the 
various exchanges are homogenized - as they must necessarily be if the SEC adopts a uniform 
rule for all - they lose much of their value. Cf. Macey & Miller, supra note 209. 
225. See Leebron, supra note 5, at 216-19; note 86, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite their nearly universal condemnation, control share statutes 
appear to be a promising solution to several pressing problems associ-
ated with so-called coercive tender offers. But, as has been argued 
here, existing control share statutes should be reworked to eliminate 
their biases in favor of target management. The ideal control share 
statute would provide for a single vote as of the bidder's acquisition of 
shares equal in number to management-controlled shares. The other 
varieties of state takeover statutes that have been adopted alone or in 
combination with control share statutes are, for the most part, nothing 
more than misguided attempts to achieve the same sort of bargaining 
balance which is effectively established by control share statutes. They 
should be repealed. Finally, there should be little need for anything 
more than a pure disclosure statute at the federal level once a well-
crafted control share statute becomes readily available.226 
226. See Leebron, supra note 5, at 221-22. 
